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Abstract
This dissertation investigates the impact of new public management (NPM) on
Saudi ministries’ openness. The study sample is three Saudi ministries: The Housing
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Moreover, this study
creates the NPM Index to measure the ministries’ NPM implementations.
Furthermore, this research uses the Public Participation Spectrum (SSP) to measure
openness. This dissertation collects data from the sample's annual reports for 2017,
and the main finding is that implementing NPM did not increase ministries’ openness.
The ministries showed different NPM implementations levels with the same level of
openness.
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Chapter One
Introduction
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The public sector is suffering from fiscal and effectiveness obstacles in many
countries around the world. For more than 30 years, public administration reformation
has been discussed frequently at the meetings of OECD countries (Bruno, 2018). To
guide reform efforts, governments have implemented new public management (NPM)
and governance theories.
Numerous studies have investigated NPM and governance. Each of these
theories either emphasizes or brings new principles and values into public
administration. For example, both NPM and governance theories emphasize
customer-oriented values (Klijin, 2012).
A customer orientation changes public administrators' traditional values:
Instead of viewing the public as clients, administrators see them as customers,
sovereign consumers (Bryson et al. 2014; Rodrigues & Pinho, 2012). As a result,
customer orientation encourages public organizations to focus on achieving customer
interests, needs, and expectations (Bruno, 2018), as well as delivering appropriate and
personalized services.
The core customer-orientation values are openness and satisfaction, and
openness includes responsiveness and transparency. Responsiveness refers to public
participation in making public organization decisions. Public organizations must be
responsive to both their employees and beneficiaries. Therefore, responsiveness
requires empowered employees and the inclusion of beneficiaries in the planning and
decision-making processes. Moreover, empowering beneficiaries requires public
institutions to have regulations allowing the public to participate in decision making
with a high level of transparency.
Transparency means the public has the right to access public organizations'
documents and includes the dimensions of instruments and goals (Bugaric, 2004).
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With full transparency, openness increases the satisfaction of both public employees
and beneficiaries (Gadot & Meiri, 2007; Rodrigus & Pinho, 2012). Scholars have
discussed that customer orientation incorporates democratic values (Balogun, 2001)
because it encourages more public decision-making participation inside public
organizations.
Scholars have identified two main types of democracy: representative and
participatory (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Moreover, scholars have divided
participatory democracy into four categories: traditional, customer-oriented,
consultation, and deliberation (Leach & Wingfield, 1999). Therefore, customer
orientation is considered a type of participatory democracy. Moreover, scholars found
that participatory democracy, such as customer-oriented, emphasizes representative
democracy (Stewart, 1995).
Second, studies divide democracy into input and output democracy (Peters,
2010). Input democracy, also called liberal representative democracy, focuses on
public participation in choosing their representatives in government. Output
democracy, called participatory democracy, involves public participation in public
organizations making decisions. Therefore, customer orientation is considered an
output democracy.
Existing researches have focused on how NPM encourages democracy in
democratic states but failed to explore if NPM motivates democratic values in nondemocratic states. Therefore, this dissertation aims to extend this investigation area by
focusing on NPM implementation in a non-democratic state. This aspect may explain
a new reason for differences between states in NPM implementations and impacts.
Furthermore, little is known about NPM in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this dissertation
has a goal to fill this gap.
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The testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state implements NPM,
openness, or citizen participation will not increase. In this study, the independent
variable is NPM implementation, and openness is the dependent variable. The
primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case study of NPM implementation
among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Arabia is a non-democratic country,
this study predicts that government ministries will ignore the openness dimension of
NPM.
The dissertation is a cross-sectional study because it focuses on one year,
2017. Furthermore, the study population is 25 ministries, but the sample is three
ministries: the Housing Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce.
These three ministries were selected for two reasons. First, it focused on those
ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public. For instance, the
Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions and issues. Most
citizens in Saudi Arabia do not own their shelter. In 2011, the housing shortage was
400,000 units (Al-Surf et al. 2014). Therefore, the expected housing shortage was
around a million units (Opoku & Abdul-Muhmin, 2012). The Health Ministry is
responsible for all health services in the country, and the Ministry of Commerce is
responsible for state commerce and all products sold in the country (Almutairi et al.
2015). Secondly, resource limitations for the study limited the analysis to just three
ministries. Finally, the dissertation’s specific question becomes: In 2017, did the NPM
implementations have a positive correlation with openness in the Housing Ministry,
the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia?
Value-based reformation is an essential topic in public administration for
many reasons. First, many scholars assert that values are essential to public
administration. For instance, George Fredrickson believes that if public administration
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had a soul, it would be the values (Molina, 2009). Max Weber encouraged scholars to
focus on substantive rationality, which includes values and ethics besides technical
tools (Hogget, 2006). Scholars, as well as practitioners, believe that public
organizations need to change their values to improve public services and goods
(Gadot & Meiri, 2007). Furthermore, the study of democratic values in public
administration can promote democracy throughout the government (the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2001). Scholars assume that
increasing focus on democratic values in public organizations will increase the
effectiveness of public agencies (Bugaric, 2004).
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter two provides a theoretical
introduction to NPM, and the chapter has ten sections. The first section compares
bureaucracy and NPM since scholars have argued whether NPM is a new movement
or an old movement. Studies have found some NPM tools among ancient Greeks and
from the 16th century in Europe. The third section details the origin of NPM. Scholars
have discussed four theories that have shaped NPM: public choice theory, principalagent theory, transaction cost theory, and institutional theory.
The next section discusses the reasons why NPM became a global movement.
There are four main factors: economic, political, external inducement, and social.
Additionally, NPM has seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition, private-sector
tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output. Moreover, it has four
main tools: public-private partnership (PPP), downsizing, performance measurement,
and delegation. NPM also incorporates three central values: responsiveness,
accountability, and transparency. After that, this chapter outlines the relationship
between NPM and democracy. Next, studies have shown some weaknesses in NPM.
As a result, scholars provided a new movement called post-NPM.
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Chapter three considers the nature of public organizations in Saudi Arabia and
has two main sections. The first section discusses the history of public organizations’
reformation in Saudi Arabia. Local and international organizations have provided
recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia. In the second half of
the 20th century, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and the United Nations (UN) provided
recommendations for the Saudi government to improve the public sector. Besides, the
Saudi government established local public entities, such as the Institute of Public
Administration (IPA), to improve the public sector.
The second section focuses on the three Saudi ministries: The Housing
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Ministry of Commerce. Scholars have divided
the history of the housing issues in Saudi Arabia into three stages. For instance, the
first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no specific public
agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The second stage was
between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In this most recent
stage, the government created the Ministry of Housing. The Ministry of Housing has
offered many programs to solve the housing problem, such as the free-land program.
The health system in Saudi Arabia is provided by both the public and private
sectors. Moreover, there are three levels for the health system: primary, advance, and
specialist. In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Almalki et
al. 2011). Scholars discussed three main stages for the Health Ministry: curative,
preventive, and regulative, and there is an overlap between these stages. Until 1978,
the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities.
In 1978, the Health Ministry established primary health care (PHC) centers.
PHC centers support the Health Ministry to include preventive activities. The third
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stage aims to make the Health Ministry focusing on regulating the health system. In
1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health Insurance
(CCHI) to expand health insurance for citizens.
The Ministry of Commerce was created in 1954 (Niblock, 2004). The Ministry
of Commerce has a long history of combination with other ministries. For instance, in
2003, the Saudi government combined the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
Ministry to became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Moreover, in 2016, the
ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce. In 2020, it became the Ministry of
Commerce.
In chapter four, the NPM implementations and openness are qualitatively
assessed. This dissertation's data comes from the digital annual report obtained from
either the official website for each ministry or Opendata.org. The researcher created
the NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations for each ministry. The NPM
Index consists of three factors: Public-Private Participation (PPP), Performance
Measurement (PM), and private-sector tools (PST).
The Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) was used to assess openness for the
ministries. SSP has five levels: Inform, Consult, Involve, Collaborate, and Empower.
The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to collect data.
In chapter five, the data were submitted to content analysis. Both the NPM
Index and SSP scores calculate for each ministry. Then, the scores present in
appendix. After that, a chart compares the ministries and shows a correlation between
NPM and openness. Finally, the conclusion provides an overview of the dissertation’s
limitations and recommendations for future studies.
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Chapter Two
New Public Management (NPM)
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Abstract
The research question has two main aspects: NPM and Saudi ministries.
Therefore, this chapter discusses NPM, which is considered one of the newer theories
in public administration. Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around six
topics. The first topic discusses the historical issues with NPM, and it has three main
issues. First, scholars have argued whether NPM is a novel theory or a rediscovered
theory. Scholars have found some NPM implementations in ancient Greek society and
the Middle Ages (Ma, 2003). The second issue discusses the relationship between
NPM and bureaucracy. NPM drives to fix bureaucracy problems (Hood, 1991). Third,
scholars have argued over the origin of NPM. Many studies discuss the main two
theories that are considered the cornerstones of NPM: new institutional economics
and business-type managerialism (Hood, 1995).
The second aspect discusses what NPM is. This topic is divided into three
matters: NPM doctrine, tools, and values. Some scholars believe in one doctrine for
NPM, such as accountability, while others expand the doctrine of NPM to seven
doctrines (Hood, 1995). Moreover, NPM is associated with many tools. For example,
NPM encourages public-private participation (Manzetti, 1994). Moreover, it
emphasizes that governments use private-sector tools such as performance
measurements. Furthermore, NPM brings new values to the public sector, such as
customer orientation and accountability for results (Gadot & Meiri, 2008).
The third topic debates the rise of NPM. Scholars have argued four main
reasons for NPM’s emergence: economics, politics, external inducement, and social.
The financial crisis and wars stressed governments to implement NPM tools such as
privatization (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001). Moreover, rising the right-wing parties
encouraged many governments, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, to
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implement NPM (Ferlie, 2001). Also, external inducement, such as the World Bank
and think tanks, persuaded governments to employ NPM (Burns, Krott, Sayadyan, &
Giessen, 2017). Additionally, low public trust for public organizations motivated the
public sector to perform NPM (Ferlie, 2017).
Fourth, many studies have discussed how NPM has affected democracy. NPM
does not address democracy (Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars
discussed the impact of NPM tools on democracy. As a result, some scholars have
found evidence that NPM encourages democracy, while others oppose this view.
Supporters assumed that NPM creates a new type of democracy called output, or
participatory democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Opponents believed that authority
should be in the hand of elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Therefore,
pubic participation damages democracy.
The fifth topic evaluates NPM, and it focuses on two issues: service quality
and cost-cutting. NPM is assumed to increase service quality and decrease costs.
Dixon and Hood (2016) found that after NPM implemented, public complaints
increased about public service, which means that the service quality decreased.
Furthermore, they found that the cost of public services, such as water distribution,
increased because of NPM tools.
Finally, this chapter discusses post-NPM as an alternative to NPM. Post-NPM
supports elected officials to have more power (Christensen, 2012). Furthermore,
institutionalism and network theories are the cornerstones of post-NPM (Frederickson
et al. 2015).
Historical Issues with NPM
This section discusses three historical aspects of NPM. First, some scholars
assumed that NPM is an old theory. They provided two main pieces of evidence.
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First, scholars found many NPM activities in Ancient Greece and Europe (Copland &
Godley, 1993). Opponents assumed that these activities were limited. Second, some
scholars suggested some NPM aspects to be implemented in the public sector, such as
using private-sector tools. Opponents discussed that these suggestions were not
implemented in the public sector.
New Public Management is a New or Rediscovered Theory
Some scholars have assumed that NPM is a new movement, while others have
believed that NPM is a rediscovered movement. NPM is thought to be a rediscovered
movement because scholars have found many professional practices and proposals
that implement aspects of NPM since ancient Greece (Ma, 2003).
Ancient Greeks used tax farming to collect taxes (Adams, 2003). Tax farming
is defined as a system that allows the highest bidder the right to collect taxes (Stella,
1993). The winning bidder pays the bid amount for the state and keeps any additional
money as profit. In the 16th century, many modern countries, such as England, France,
and Spain, implemented tax farming systems (Copland & Godley, 1993).
Ancient Greeks and other states used tax farming because tax farming is an
efficient strategy. The government collected the taxes in advance at a low cost
because they did not need to hire employees to collect taxes. Moreover, the states did
not have experts in taxation. Therefore, using tax farming was the best available
solution for governments.
Opponents found that tax farming was not an efficient strategy because the
governments lost three things: money, decision making, and information. For
instance, the government received just 24% of the collected taxes (Cizakca, 1996).
The rest went to both the tax farmer and contract guarantors. Also, the government
lost its authority to make tax decisions. Tax farmers increased their power and worked
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to influence tax decisions (Ma, 2003). In some cases, the tax farmers controlled the
government by managing the tax amount. Third, the tax farmers preferred to keep the
tax-collection information secret. Therefore, the government had a lack of information
about taxes.
Besides, scholars have discussed power as the main disadvantage of tax
farming. First, tax farming granted some authority to tax farmers. Some governments
solved this problem by electing members of minority groups to be tax farmers. The
minority groups were easy to replace because they did not have high power inside the
state.
In 1832, Sir Henry Parnell published On Financial Reform. In the book,
Parnell argued that if public agencies implemented a private-sector structure, they
would save approximately one-third of their expenditure (Bowery et al., 2017). As an
illustration, Parnell compared two dockyards: the naval dockyards and a private
shipbuilder. The naval dockyards had 248 shipwrights, 18 clerks, six masters of
trades, eight supervisors, eight measurers, and 11 cabin keepers. By contrast, the
private dockyard had 250 shipwrights, two clerks, one foreman, one measurer, and ten
laborers. Parnell found that the private dockyard was more efficient because it had a
lower number of employees than the Naval dockyards. Similarly, in the 1830s,
Samuel Bentham encouraged outsourcing because it increases the efficiency and
effectiveness of public organizations.
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson explained that public administration was initially
business administration, and that public administration should use private-sector
applications. Moreover, scholars found that starting in 1905; there was a national
movement in the US to empower bureaucrats to improve public organizations
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(Riccucci, 2001). The accountability principle was an obstacle to implementing
bureaucrats' empowerment.
Scholars have used the preceding evidence to emphasize that NPM is a
rediscovered theory. These points are lacking for two reasons: First, the provided
evidence is limited in both implementation and geography. For instance, privatization
by the ancient Greeks was in a single public application: tax farming. Moreover, it
was limited to one region in the world. Second, market-orientation recommendations
were not implemented in the 19th century. Scholars discussed market orientation as a
theory, but no government implemented it. As a result, most scholars look to the
1980s as the beginning of NPM.
NPM vs. Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy was created in the 1930s and 1940s (Osborne & Gaebier, 1992). It is
defined as an administrative system designed to accomplish large-scale administrative
tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals (Olsen, 2006).
Max Weber is considered the father of bureaucratic management theory, so it is also
called Weberian. He looked to bureaucracy as an efficient mode of organizing public
organizations (Ferlie, 2017).
Bureaucracy is based on public interest-oriented models. Bureaucrats work to
achieve public interest rather than their self-interests. In response, bureaucrats have
job security and social position. The proper administration of bureaucracy is defined
as having two aspects: the rule of law and efficiency (Dixon & Hood, 2016). The ruleof-law aspect involves looking at bureaucrats as an instrument to implement the law
(Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012). Bureaucrats must enforce law carefully, honestly, and
consistently across the same cases. Efficient in bureaucratic terms means the least
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cost. Least cost does not mean spending less overall but spending the least amount of
money on services.
Much previous work on bureaucracy has focused on four assumptions: selfsufficiency, hierarchy, accountability, and procedures (De Araújo, 2001). First,
bureaucracy requires public organizations to have self-sufficiency. For instance, each
public organization provides its services and goods by itself. Moreover, it hires
required employees to accomplish its task. Second, bureaucracy assumes that the
hierarchy structure is ideal for public organizations (Homburg, 2004). The hierarchy
structure allows high management to control the organization. Third, accountability,
in bureaucracy theory, is a top-down process (Hupe & Hill, 2007). Elected officials
are responsible for low public services and goods. Finally, bureaucrats should focus
on procedures more than results.
Scholars have discussed the many problems of bureaucracy, such as doublebind management (Dixon & Hood, 2016). Double-bind management happens when
bureaucrats send contradictory messages to their employees. For instance, bureaucrats
ask for high accuracy with less time. Scholars assume that high accuracy requires
more time, and the opposite is exact. To solve this problem, scholars have introduced
the target-setting homeostatic method. It encourages bureaucrats to balance
contradictory goals.
Scholars who have discussed NPM within bureaucracy have determined that
NPM should be used to correct bureaucracy failures (Hood, 1991). They have asserted
that NPM is based on values that run counter to Weberian values or at least move
away from Weberian values (Ferlie, 2017; Pollitt & Buckaert, 2011). For instance,
public choice theory rejects public interest-oriented models. The public choice theory
assumes that bureaucrats work to maximize their budgets and power. Therefore,
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bureaucrats are looking for new tools to increase their strength and achieve private
interests.
Origin of NPM
In the 1980s, NPM appeared in Anglo-Saxon countries (Christensen & Fan,
2018). Contributions from many fields, such as political science and economics,
created NPM (Lane, 2000). Scholars define NPM in many ways. First, NPM is the
many techniques and strategies used to enhance public organizations' performance
(Pfiffner, 2004). This definition rejects any theoretical basis for NPM (Dunn &
Miller, 2007). Second, NPM has adopted market techniques that focus on increasing
both effectiveness and efficiency (Liegl, 1998). Therefore, NPM is an umbrella term
that describes different tools to increase the public sector's efficiency. This
dissertation limited NPM to three main factors: public-private collaboration, privatesector tools, and performance measurements.
While NPM does not eliminate the old framework of public administration, it
adds new approaches. Scholars believe that NPM rebalances some old public
administration doctrine (Iacovino, Barsanti, & Cinquini, 2017). One representative
example is NPM rebalancing accountability by increasing public accountability
(Robinson, 2015).
Scholars have discussed many roots of NPM. At the same time, there is an
overlap between them (Hood, 1995). Some scholars have argued that NPM was born
out of a marriage between new institutional economics and business-type
managerialism. For instance, the new institutional economics movement was built on
three theories: public choice, transaction cost, and principal-agent (Hood, 1991).
Furthermore, it had four doctrines: contestability or competition, user choice,
transparency, and incentive structures (Hood, 1991).
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Other scholars have shown that NPM came from four theoretical
microeconomic frameworks: public choice theory, principal-agent theory, transaction
cost theory, and institutional theory (Boston, 1991). The public choice theory, or
public choice, is considered the basis of NPM (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Public
choice focuses on the individual as the basic unit of analysis (Ostrom & Ostrom,
1971). Therefore, it focuses on decision making. It has four assumptions: First,
individuals are self-interested (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Self-interest assumes that
each person has different preferences than others that affect his decisions. Second,
individuals are rational. Rationality means that an individual can rank his preferences.
The third assumption is about maximizing strategy. Each individual is looking for the
option that provides the highest benefit. Finally, people make their choices based on
the information that they have. These four assumptions were used to analyze
bureaucrats' decision making.
The public choice theory has affected bureaucracy in many ways. First,
bureaucrats focus on their self-interest over the public interest (Fornasier & Franklin,
2019). Self-interest encourages public organizations to be inefficient (Silvestre et al.,
2020). For example, saving public money and decreasing taxation are not a priority
for bureaucrats. Furthermore, self-interest opposes the central concept of bureaucracy
that bureaucrats are neutral. Moreover, individuals prefer to act on their preferences
and to have free choice. As a result, public choice recommends marketization and
contracting out.
The second theory is the principal-agent theory, also called the agency theory.
Agency theory produces an assumption of low trust between elected officials and
bureaucrats (Ferlie, 2017). Namely, it assumes that the relationship between a
principal (elected officials) and agents (bureaucrats) should be structured by a tight
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contract (Boston, 2011). For instance, elected officials and bureaucrats may have
different assumptions. Therefore, bureaucrats may shirk their responsibilities because
they are not always observable by elected officials.
Agency theory has two main implications in NPM: human resource
management (HRM) systems and external oversight. For example, NPM encourages
HRM to pay for performance, especially for senior managers. To renew a contract or
raise a salary, managers need to achieve the key performance indicators (KPIs). A
subcommittee on a public agency board makes the KPIs and manages contracts with
public managers.
Furthermore, the principal-agent theory encourages external oversight for
political decisions about public spending (Ferlie, 2017). For example, the UK
government created the Office for Budgetary Responsibility. Its main goal is to
review and comment on public expenditure plans that are introduced by elected
officials. Furthermore, the Office for Budgetary Responsibility works as an expert and
independent organization.
The third theory is the transaction cost theory. While choice theory encourages
contracting out or privatization of public services and goods to reduce costs, the
transaction cost theory highlights that there is a cost for each choice, so bureaucrats
should calculate those before making their decisions (Hefetz & Warner, 2007). The
transaction cost theory provides many ways to calculate public projects' costs
(Tolofari, 2005). For instance, some scholars focus on the total cost of each strategy.
Others focus on the total cost for each stage of public projects. Furthermore,
transaction cost includes administration costs (Bel & Fageda, 2006). Administration
costs occur because in any contracting out or privatization, there is incomplete
information.
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The fourth theory is the institutional theory. Scholars have discussed this
theory’s many assumptions. Two assumptions are related to NPM: external
environment and functionalism (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). First, each organization is
influenced by and influences society (Hoque, 2005). This dynamic gives legitimacy
and social acceptance of the institution (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). Second,
organizations' internal rules affect employees' behavior (Newberry, 2003). These
assumptions have significant impacts on NPM.
Institutional theory's assumptions encourage NPM to include public
participation and implement private-sector tools. External environment assumptions
encouraged the social contract between public organizations and the public.
Moreover, the theory encourages public agencies to align their values, structures, and
operation with their society (Lammers & Garcia, 2017). The functionalism
assumption enables public organizations to focus on their internal functions.
Moreover, it invites public organizations to implement private-sector tools in dealing
with employees, such as incentives, because they are more efficient than public sector
tools.
NPM Doctrine, Tools, and Values
Much of the debate over NPM has revolved around three topics: doctrine,
tools, and values. For instance, Hood (1995) assumed that accountability is the
doctrine of NPM. However, the work of Lorenz demonstrated that neoliberalism is the
NPM doctrine (2012).

18

The doctrine of NPM
NPM aims to answer the question of how the government delivers services.
Therefore, scholars do not have an agreement about a specific doctrine for NPM. For
instance, some scholars have introduced one doctrine, while others have expanded
NPM to encompass seven doctrines. For example, Hood (1995) discussed that NPM
has one central doctrine: accountability. NPM focused on accountability based on
results or outputs. To achieve this goal, NPM borrowed private sector tools.
Other scholars believe that neoliberalism is the doctrine of NPM (Fornasier &
Franklin, 2019; Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberalism has four factors: the free market, private
industry, management, the consumer. The free market factor encourages the
government to eliminate all limited legislation markets. When there is no restriction
on the market, the competition will be high. As a result, high competition encourages
efficiency. Private companies encourage all public services to be provided by the
private sector. The third factor is management, which emphasizes efficiency.
Efficiency requires the private sector to work without obstacles. Fourth, neoliberalism
encourages high transparency. High transparency is vital for consumers to implement
their purchasing power. Furthermore, high transparency requires well-informed
consumers.
Other scholars have added managerialism. Managerialism brought about a
new movement to replace administration by management in public administration
(Aucoin, 1990). While the administration encourages bureaucracy to focus on process
and procedure, management focuses on achieving goals. Furthermore, it promotes
decentralization. Thereby, bureaucrats have more authority.
Some scholars have discussed three doctrines and called the set the three Ms:
market, management, and measurement (Ferlie, 2017). The market principle creates a
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new type of relationship between each public organization and its governmental
suppliers: a provider-purchaser relationship. A contract controls purchasers' and
providers' relationships. In this situation, purchasers have the power to affect the
efficiency of providers because they have an opportunity to change providers. The
market does not mean just privatization but also quasi-markets. In some cases, public
organizations have limited market entry. Therefore, they need time to have many
market entries so they can transfer to the full market principle.
The second M is management. NPM’s slogan is that management must
manage. The management principle aims to empower managers in public
organizations. Scholars have advanced two main aspects: management capacity and
management style. In management capacity, a public manager’s role shifts from the
normal bureaucratic process to make changes. Many operational functions are
transferred to an executive. The second aspect is the management style. Studies show
that many management styles exist. Some public organizations implement corporate
governance reform, which emphasizes that the public organization has a board. The
board consists of members from outside the public organization—the board sets and
monitors performance.
Furthermore, the board dominates the lower managerial level. This style is
borrowed from the private sector to include all stakeholders. Each organization has
internal and external stakeholders (Al-Surf et al., 2013). Internal stakeholders are
bodies that execute the organization's regulations. External stakeholders are bodies
that are affected by the organization's regulations.
The third M is measurement. To promote public organizations' performance,
NPM emphasizes that performance should be measured, such as with total quality
management (Vakkuri, 2010). The measurements in NPM focus on outputs.
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Furthermore, measurements give an ability to internal and external groups to oversee
public organizations. For instance, regulators and auditors oversee public
organizations based on their measurements (Power, 1997). Scholars have determined
two types of measurements: proactive and reactive measurements. Proactive measures
aim to improve the quality of services and goods.
Conversely, reactive measurements are used to hide entity problems (Burgues
& Matas, 2017). For example, some educational institutions focus on student
satisfaction. At the same time, student satisfaction does not lead to the improvement
of education (Dunn & Miller, 2007).
Donald Kettl (2005) discussed six doctrines for NPM. The first doctrine is
productivity. Productivity focuses on how the government produces more services at
less cost. The public puts pressure on governments to decrease tax. Therefore,
governments should focus on providing services at the lowest cost.
The second doctrine is marketization. Kettl discussed two strategies for public
organizations. First, public organizations sell their entities to the private sector, which
is called privatization. Second, public organizations partner with nonpublic
organizations to deliver services. Both strategies make changes in which bureaucrats
behaviors mimic the private sector. Service orientation encourages public managers to
include the public on improving public services and goods. Therefore, it provides
bottom-to-top communication. Decentralization aims to increase both public
responsiveness and effectiveness. Decentralization gives lower levels of government,
such as local government or front-line managers, the power and authority to respond
to the public, and improve public services and goods. The fifth doctrine is policy
orientation. This doctrine is aimed at changing government strategy from a service
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provider model to a service purchaser mode. Finally, accountability for results drives
public organizations to focus on outputs rather than procedures.
Other scholars have introduced seven doctrines: disaggregation, competition,
private-sector tools, efficiency, hands-on management, standards, and output (Aucoin,
1990; Hood, 1991; Lane, 2000). The first aspect is the disaggregation, which has two
meanings. The first meaning is dividing each public organization into small units
(Verschuere & Barbieri, 2009). The second meaning is decentralization (Yamamoto,
2003). The second aspect is the competition (Ferlie & Steane, 2002). NPM aims to
increase competition, either between public organizations or between public
organizations and the private sector. The third aspect is using private-sector tools.
NPM emphasizes the use of proven private-sector practices in public organizations.
The fourth aspect is efficiency. Scholars focus on cutting costs. This aspect
emphasizes the bottom line in public organizations by increasing labor discipline and
decreasing job security. The fifth aspect is visible, hands-on management. Employees
in public organizations should have an exact assignment of responsibility. Therefore,
accountability would focus on responsibility.
Furthermore, this aspect requires fewer procedural constraints to support
employees’ achievement of their responsibilities. The sixth aspect is measurable
standards. Efficiency, based on this aspect, relates to the organization’s goals. The
sixth aspect is accountability. Scholars have discussed accountability in many ways.
First, NPM empowers appointed managers and the public. Therefore, responsibility is
shifted from elected officials to the public (Ferlie, 2001). Some scholars have argued
that shifting does not affect elected officials' accountability; it just increases public
accountability. Second, the private sector mechanism affects accountability in two
ways: performance indicators and boards. First, the instrument requires clear goals

22

with performance indicators for each public agency. As a result, accountability is
linked to these goals. Second, market mechanisms motivate public agencies to have
boards. Boards do oversight and have accountability roles. The seventh aspect is
output. NPM requires public organizations to focus on results. One method to do that
is using pay based on performance strategy. Implementation of NPM does not require
the implementation of all these features (Wennstrom, 2015).
Scholars have described other features of NPM. First, it is a politically neutral
theory (Common, 1998). Both conservatives and social democrats apply it. For
instance, NPM does not suggest that the private sector provides services instead of the
public sector, but it presents a new type of management of that provision. Second,
NPM expands the contracting-out strategy to include new areas, such as education.
Third, the NPM theory brings new terms from the private sector to use in the public
sector. For example, the NPM theory explains the relationship between the
government and its employees as a principal-agent relationship. Fourth, NPM is a mix
of public choice theory and private management.
Governments have three types of tasks: providing goods and services,
maintaining income, and regulating markets, and the private sector. In providing
goods, NPM emphasizes contracting out. To do that, governments need to hire experts
in negotiation, settlement, and execution of contracts. Therefore, the NPM requires
that public managers look more like chief executive officers.
NPM Tools
This section discusses four NPM tools: PPP, PM, PST, and public
participation.
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Public-private partnership (PPP). Public organizations have two types of
partnerships: public-private partnership and public-public partnership (Silvestre et al.
2020). This section focuses on public-private partnerships because it is a part of NPM
and a cornerstone of this study. NPM focuses on steer, not row services (Bumgarner
& Newswander, 2009; Dunn & Miller, 2007; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019).
Steering can happen through PPP by either privatization or contracting-out.
Scholars have introduced many definitions for PPPs based on its aspects. For instance,
some scholars minimized PPP to privatization (Savas, 2000). They excluded
contracting out from PPP. Other scholars included any type of collaboration between
public and private entities. For instance, Manzetti (1994) defined both as the private
sector providing public services instead of public organizations. Some studies focused
on the financial aspect, so they defined PPP as a way for public organizations to pass
some financial restrictions.
PPP is different from traditional contracts in three main ways: bundle, risk,
and structure. First, in PPP, the private sector runs all the project duties, so the private
sector typically adopts PPP in the early stages of public projects (Asaolu &
Agbetunde, 2014; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). As a result, the private partner has a
strong influence on the public project. Furthermore, PPP is more complicated,
requiring high expertise (Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Moreover, PPP takes a longer
time than traditional contracts (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Second, in PPP, the
private partner has a higher risk than in traditional partnerships because the private
entity is sharing risk with the public agency (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). Classic
collaboration creates a high risk for public agencies, while PPP creates a high risk for
private partners.
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Third, PPP is a mutual relationship, so it rejects hierarchy (Boyer et al., 2015;
Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP requires
decision-making equity. As a result, PPP's decision-making process is a multiway
approach. It combines top-down and bottom-up approaches. The multiway approach
involves empowering all stakeholders through information and authority (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2001). Furthermore, it requires a more flexible system than bureaucracy.
The partners have the same responsibilities and rights. PPP thus makes the public
sector more complicated.
Scholars believe that PPPs have four essential elements: cooperation, clear
objectives and goals, market mechanisms, and sharing of risk (Asaolu & Agbetunde,
2014; Muhammad et al. 2016). PPP is a cooperation between either for-profit or
nonprofit entities and public agencies. At the same time, both of them work to achieve
clear objectives and goals. Furthermore, they implement a market mechanism in
dealing with consumers. Besides, they share the cooperation risk. Some scholars have
included nonprofit organizations. Others exclude them. Therefore, NPM supports a
particular collaboration model called the public-private partnership (PPP)
(Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011).
Moreover, PPP is not a novel governmental strategy. Theories have been
presented about PPP before the dissemination of public choice theory. In 1938, the
U.S. federal government created a secondary market for home mortgages. Scholars
have determined that this was the first application of PPP (Bovaird, 2004).
In the 1970s, public-private partnerships (PPPs) were adopted by governments
in many states (Bovaird, 2004). Scholars vary in defining PPPs' parts. For instance,
some studies include the nonprofit sector, while others exclude it. Other studies
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exclude for-profit organizations being a part of PPPs. Others have both nonprofit and
for-profit organizations in PPPs.
The main difference is that in contracting-out, the public entity still owns the
service assets, while in privatization, the private sector owns the service assets
(Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Furthermore, in contracting out, public agencies can
control services' performance because they can change the contractors when the
contractors do not achieve the expected result.
PPP is considered a hybrid strategy (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014). For
instance, PPP is a preferred strategy for two main reasons: downsizing and efficiency
(Pack, 1987). The first reason is that PPP decreases the growth of the public sector,
downsizing. For instance, downsizing begins with employees, and PPP supports
public organizations to reduce their employees (Weikart, 2001). As a result, the
expenditures of public organizations decrease. Finally, the government needs little
money to work, which means low taxation.
Scholars found mixed results for the impact of PPP on the public workforce.
The United Kingdom's government decreased its proportion of employees from 29%
in 1979 to 23% in 1991 (Ferlie, 2001). In the United States, an evaluation found that
contracting out affected 5% of federal employees (Fernandez & Smith, 2005). Stein
supported the notion that PPP significantly reduced public workers (1990). Other
scholars, such as Fernandez et al., found that PPP decreased full-time public
employees, but it increased part-time public employees (2006). Donahue claimed that
the impact of PPP on public workers small (2002).
The second reason is that the private sector is more efficient than the public
sector. Therefore, privatization may increase efficiency in public goods and services.
Privatization requires deregulation. Some scholars point out that market failure is a
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phenomenon that the government should be cautious about when it privatizes public
goods and services (Manzetti, 1994).
Scholars found three types of reasons that encouraged the public sector to
apply PPP. The first type of reason focuses on the government level. For instance,
governments face complex issues that they cannot solve alone (Fornasier & Franklin,
2019). Therefore, PPP is a requirement to solve this kind of problem (Jacobs, 2000).
Also, cost-saving becomes a priority for public organizations, and PPP is a strategy to
achieve it (Asaolu & Agbetunde, 2014; Silvestre et al. 2020). The Second type is
global institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, support and promotes PPPs
(Jones, 1999). The global institutions encouraged the public sector to implement PPP.
The third type focused on the head of the public organizations. The leading
theory in this type is the revolving door theory (Maillet et al. 2019). Revolving door
refers to employees’ changeover between the public and private sectors (Castellani &
Dulitzky, 2017). The theory implies that the transition employees’ between the two
industries decreases the barriers.
Several scholars have openly questioned whether if the revolving door
supported PPP. Mailler et al., in their study of the revolving door in Chile, found that
the revolving door existed, but it did not affect the public managers (2019). The
public managers were public-oriented. However, Castellani and Dulitzky studied
public managers in Argentina (2018). They found that the revolving door supported
privatization and private sector tools in public organizations.
There is a global movement to support PPP. Some governments have created
public agencies to support PPP. In 2008, Canada started Public-Private Partnership
Canada to advocate for public agencies to use more PPP (Krawchenko & Stoney,
2011). PPP achieves some NPM goals, such as small government and deregulation
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(Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012). For instance, PPP supports public agencies to do their
tasks without hiring more staff or buying equipment.
Furthermore, PPP emphasizes governments to lower barriers to the private
sector. Lower barriers support a government paying low prices to ensure that the
private partner can achieve the contract's goals. The second goal is delegation. One of
the main parts of NPM is decentralization. Therefore, the bureaucrats should have
more authority. To have more control, politicians need to delegate most of their power
to the bureaucrats to contract out the public service.
Unfortunately, scholars have found that PPP has a democratic deficit
(Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). For instance, some PPPs require high confidentiality,
which affects transparency. Therefore, some information is not available to the public.
For example, the Freedom of Information Act allows PPPs to provide a lower amount
of information to the public than traditional public agencies' projects (Bovaird, 2004).
Also, PPP is a long-term contract, so the cost is divided across many budgets. As a
result, the PPPs' actual cost is not exact for the public. Also, some public agencies use
PPP to pass reasonable spending restrictions.
Furthermore, PPP decreases public responsiveness because some PPPs are not
debatable with the public. Further, PPP does not have international accounting
standards or comprehensive rules, which exacerbates PPP's democratic deficit
(OECD, 2009 in Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Besides, some researchers have found
that leaders' opinions guide some PPPs' decisions (Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012).
Scholars have discussed some public agencies' disadvantages when using
PPPs, such as the information disadvantage. The private sector has more information
than public agencies, so it has more power in negotiation (Boyer et al., 2015). Public
participation can resolve this disadvantage by offering more information for
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bureaucrats. A study found that the public provides essential information to public
organizations, but this information does not solve PPPs' information disadvantage
(Boyer et al. 2015). Moreover, PPP has a problem with accountability. For instance, if
a public service is weak, the public does not know whom to blame (Fornasier &
Franklin, 2019).
Saudi Arabia is no exception. For instance, public agencies implement PPPs
because of financing limitations (Tahat, 2014). In 2011, the Saudi Crown Investment
and Green IT Globe created a new company called DACENTEC Saudi Arabia (Tahat,
2014). DACENTEC has the goal of improving the collaboration between public
entities and the private sector. Furthermore, public agencies prefer a particular type of
PPP called build-operate-transfer (BOT). In BOT, the private partner makes the
project design and builds it for a while. After that, the private partner transfers the
project to the public agency.
Performance Measurements (PM). The public sector criticized because of
inefficiency. Therefore, the public sector borrowed performance measurements from
the private sector (Brignall & Modell, 2000). PM requires every public organization
to have clear standards, and it has three significant impacts on the public sector:
accountability, transparency, and efficiency. First, PM made a shift in public sector
accountability (Kloot, 2009). For instance, bureaucracy focused on procedural
accountability. Conversely, PM emphasized performance accountability.
Second, PM increased public sector transparency. Scholars discussed two
types of transparency: internal and external. Internal transparency means that the
performance measurement informs managers about their organization's activities and
service costs (Bruijn, 2002). On the contrary, the external transparency is that
performance measurement encouraged more stakeholders to participate in the
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accountability process (Modell, 2000). Scholars discussed that PM encouraged at least
three stakeholder groups: financial support groups, professional employees inside the
public organizations, and the service receiver (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). Third,
PM increased public organizations’ efficiency. For instance, each public organization
can assess its performance based on these standards.
Scholars discussed many tools for PM, such as benchmarking. In 1979, the
Xerox Corporation applied benchmarking for the first because of the competition with
Canon (Jackson, 2001). Magd and Curry (2003) defined benchmarking as
management practices designed to improve the organizations’ performance in three
main aspects: strategic, competitive, and useful tools to achieve the best value.
Therefore, benchmarking requires comparison, either internal or external, public
organizations (Kloot, 2009). For instance, public organizations can use benchmarking
to compare their units or use it to measure up to other public organizations in the same
sector. Moreover, benchmarking can use for processes, reports, and plans (Cassell et
al. 2001).
Benchmarking has three main steps (Magd & Curry, 2003). The first step is to
identify the best practice in the field. Then, public leaders monitor progress. Finally,
they review their organization to make a plan to improve their organizations. Camp
(1989) expanded benchmarking to five steps. The first step is planning. In this step,
the public manager determines the functions to benchmark. Furthermore, he chooses
the target benchmark. The organization then analyzes the gap between its functions
and the target to include reporting gaps to the organization's goals. The fourth step is
action. The public organization improves its process to achieve the goal. Finally, the
best practice includes in the daily operation of the organization.
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Many studies evaluated the benchmark, and the studies can be divided into
two groups. The first studies group compared the public-sector and private-sector
organizations. These studies found that the model was limited in the public sector
(Magd & Curry, 2001). The second group discussed the impact of the benchmark on
public organizations. They found mixed results. Ogden and Wilson investigated 12
national health services centers and found that the centers collected data about the
field's best practices (2000). Unfortunately, This information did not convert to a plan
to improve the centers. Another study examined the Inland Revenue Accounts Office
in the United Kingdom in 1999. The benchmark increased customer satisfaction to be
7.8 out of 10 (Magd & Curry, 2001).
Scholars found many problems with PM in the public sector. The first problem
is that the PM reports do not have enough information, allowing auditors to evaluate
the public organization (Wisniewski & Stewart, 2004). In 1997, half of the local
public entities in Scotland provided the PM reports, and half of these reports had
incomplete information to assess managers.
The second problem is that PM aims to inform the stakeholders., but there are
different groups of stakeholders (Brignall & Modell, 2000). Moreover, each group
focuses on precise information. Therefore, most public organizations fail to provide
appropriate information for each group (Mascarenhas, 1996).
In 2016, the Saudi government established The National Center for
Performance Measurement (ADAA, an Arabic word means performance) (The
National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report, 2018). In the same
year, the government enforced ministries to include performance measurements for
their annual reports. ADAA supported the ministries by offering training programs
and workshops for ministries’ employees to train them about the performance
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measurements. In 2017, 2166 public employees participated in ADAA’s training
programs (The National Center for Performance Measurement - Annual Report,
2018).
Public participation. One of the main elements in NPM is being customer oriented.
Customer orientation requires that public agencies respond to their consumers. Thus,
the public becomes more involved and participatory with public organizations. The
main goal for public participation is increasing effectiveness (Cheyne, 1999). Public
involvement or participation has two types: direct and indirect involvement (Boyer,
Slyke, & Rogers, 2015; Cheyne, 1999). Indirect involvement happens when the public
involves selecting the elected officials. Conversely, direct involvement includes all
public activities among public officials. This section discusses direct public
participation because it is related to the dissertation question.
Scholars discussed that public participation has different perspectives based on
the type of government. For instance, democratic countries are looking for public
participation as apart of their political process (Linde & Karlsson, 2013). Therefore,
there is no democracy without public participation. On the other hand, nondemocratic regimes use public participation as a tool to improve their image as a
modern regime in front of democratic regimes (Johnson & Kolko, 2010).
Furthermore, non-democratic regimes do not allow public participation to make any
kind of threat to the government. Therefore, public participation in non-democratic
countries is not to respond to public opinions but to make international legitimacy.
Studies have shown four levels of public involvement. The first level is the
informed level when a public agency provides information to the public (Rowe &
Frewer, 2000). Second, some public agencies involve the public in consultation. Some
governments, such as the USA, force public entities to include the public when they
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are affected by the new policy. For example, the USA has The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) of 1946. The APA requires most public agencies to ask for
public comment through a notice of proposed policy published in the Federal Register
(West, 2004). Third, a public agency includes the public to provide solutions for
public issues. Finally, public agencies may consist of the public to exercise policy.
Scholars have asserted that direct public involvement is required because
public organizations face massive problems and multidimensional concerns (Ianniello
et al. 2019). Moreover, direct public involvement has advantages, such as increasing
the decision quality and decreasing project time. Furthermore, some public policy
needs the public to change their attitudes and behavior (Cheyne, 1999). However,
direct public involvement has limitations because the public lacks knowledge in some
cases.
Scholars have explained many advantages of direct public involvement. First,
direct public involvement improves the quality of decisions (Ianniello et al., 2019).
For instance, public involvement clarifies policy goals and objectives. In some cases,
the public provides alternative solutions. Also, the public can provide important
information to bureaucrats. Second, public involvement decreases the cost and time.
Including the public increases decision-making time. However, it reduces
implementation because it eliminates public resistance. Third, public involvement
encourages reconciliation between citizens, groups, and parties. Fourth, public
involvement maintains legitimacy for public agencies. Fifth, it makes a civil society.
Direct public involvement has limitations. First, the public lacks knowledge of
some issues (Kathlene & Martin, 1991). Scholars have discussed ameliorating this
limitation in two ways: training programs and reachable information. Public agencies
can offer training programs to help the public learn the needed skills. In the 1980s,
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Chicago, Illinois, had a dysfunctional education system (Fung & Wright, 2001). In
1988, a reformation shifted power to the public by creating the Local School Council.
The Local School Council had 11 members: six parents, two community members,
two teachers, and a school principal. All members were elected every two years.
Later, the public noticed a lack of knowledge and capacity in the Local School
Council's members. In 1995, a new law required each Local School Council member
to attend a training program for 20 hours. Some scholars have argued that training
programs were not enough because experts have varied opinions on most public
issues (Laird, 1993). Moreover, scholars have suggested that public organizations
make relevant information merely reachable.
The second limitation is the difficulty of agreement. The public has varied
opinions. Therefore, accepting one opinion is complicated. This limitation also occurs
among experts (Laird, 1993). The third limitation is the expectations. In some cases,
the public has a different expectation than bureaucrats. For instance, when bureaucrats
involve the public by hearing from them, the public believes that the bureaucrats are
implementing their suggestions (Cheyne, 1999). Different expectations may lead to
public resistance.
Responsiveness increases public organizations' effectiveness, and
responsiveness improves them (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005). When public
agencies deal with the public as customers, they change from valuing collectivism to
individualism. Some scholars believe that the new value is not because of NPM, but
the public has already adopted it. There is a great deal of evidence for that, such as
low voting rates and low public-party membership (Aberbach & Christensen, 2005).
In Saudi Arabia, studies have shown mixed findings of public participation in
public agencies. Addas (2017) found low public participation. He analyzed the
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relationship between the municipal council and the public in Jeddah. Both councilors
and people had a lack of understanding of public involvement.
Alshaikh (2019) assumed that the Arab Spring 2011 was vital for public
participation in Saudi Arabia. The fear of revolution encourages public agencies to
include the public in their public policy. The study analyzed the Labour Ministry.
Based on the ministry’s report, the government responded to public opinions on social
media. Furthermore, each ministry created a participatory management department to
allow the public to participate in available programs. Public participation has
increased since 2011, but it is still not obligatory for public agencies (Alshaikh, 2019).
Simultaneously, the study found that the public even does not think that they have a
voice.
In another study in a different region of Saudi Arabia, the East, the researcher
interviewed administrators on the civic, municipal council (Alsayel, 2016). The
participants believed that the public should participate in decision making because the
public is the beneficiary of public projects. At the same time, public workers showed
some concerns about public participation. First, the public may assume that their
opinions are mandatory for public employees to consider. Public employees are
looking to the public as nonexperts, so public opinion is often ignorable. Second,
some public officials think that public participation increases the period of projects.
Furthermore, it increases the effort of public agencies. Conversely, some officials
assume that public participation motivates wealthy beneficiaries to support public
projects.
Alsaggaf (2012) studied using social media for public participation in
disasters. The study focused on the Jeddah flood of 2009. The research found that the
public expressed their opinions plainly on social media. Furthermore, public officials
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responded to public requests. Besides, the crowd was using social media to challenge
the official comment on some situations.
NPM Values.
NPM has many fundamental values (Gadot & Meiri, 2008). For instance,
NPM focuses on responsiveness to citizens as customers. Furthermore, NPM requires
a high level of accountability and transparency. Moreover, NPM emphasizes
innovation and renewal of old bureaucratic structure and processes. Finally, NPM
stresses performance. Schein's ideas (1985) are considered the base of NPM. These
changes called for reform of the public administration's assumptions, values, and
norms regarding the public.
Scholars have compared traditional public administration values with NPM
values. Person and Goldkuhl showed that NPM created a shift in traditional
bureaucracy theory values (Rose & Persson, 2012). For instance, NPM changed
legitimate authority to customer orientation. Furthermore, the rule of law became
decentralized in NPM. NPM caused a shift away from complete adherence to rules
toward mission and goals. Efficiency from the traditional bureaucracy changed to
accountability for results. The effectiveness value became related to client needs. The
equality value is transferred to focus on cost-efficiency. Legality shifted to focus on
productivity. A focus on earning replaced the value of impartiality. The value of
objectivity became less critical than market mechanisms. Transparency turned into
more flexibility and discretion in NPM. Where traditional bureaucracy emphasized
accountability in the process, NPM stresses the empowerment of street-level
bureaucrats. The NPM pushed control from hierarchy to the community.
Hood (1991) introduced seven main points regarding NPM. NPM focuses on
professional management. Furthermore, it has specific performance standards and
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measurements. NPM emphasizes output control. Also, NPM disaggregates public
sector units. NPM emphasizes competition in the public sector and implements
private sector styles of management practice. Finally, NPM has a high discipline for
resource use. Hood’s points show three main aspects of NPM: an attempt to reverse
government growth, less spending and staffing through privatization, and information
technology.
Osborne and Galber (1992) discussed NPM values as solutions for public
sector problems. They introduced ten values that each government should implement.
The first value is the catalytic government. Catalytic government focuses on
leadership rather than service delivery. The second value is the community-owned
government. Citizens should have power through public choice. The third value is a
competitive government by making competition when providing services and
products. The fourth value is mission-driven government. Mission-driven government
is driven to improve communities instead of being driven by rules. The fifth value is
the results-oriented government. The public sector should focus on results rather than
on the budget. The sixth point is customer-driven government by focusing on
achieving the needs of customers, not the public organization itself. The seventh value
is the enterprising government that concentrates on earning more than spending. The
eighth value is the anticipatory government. Public organizations need to focus on
preventing more than curing. The ninth value is decentralized government, so
governments need to transfer from the hierarchical structures to participation and
teamwork structures (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). The ten value is market-oriented
government.
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Rise of NPM
Scholars assume that NPM is a general reformation (Hood, 1995). For
instance, they have found NPM tools in most developed countries. There are four
groups of factors contributing to the rise of NPM: economic, political, external
inducement, and social.
Researchers have debated three economic factors: the size of government,
financial scarcity, and the neoliberal movement. The welfare state created a vast
government. Furthermore, governments faced fiscal problems gradually, so they were
looking for solutions to implement. Fortunately, the neoliberal movement provided
some solutions for governments.
Besides, political factors have encouraged governments to implement NPM.
Elected officials have faced some obstacles in overseeing bureaucrats. Moreover,
political scandals have decreased public trust in government and its branches.
Therefore, the need for reformation was urgent. Also, political leaders in many states
belonged to the right-wing.
Many external entities have played critical roles in the rise of NPM. For
instance, global organizations and aid providers have encouraged developing
countries to improve their public sector by implementing NPM. Moreover, think tanks
and educational institutions have enlightened policymakers about NPM. In addition,
public institutions have hired advisors with private sector backgrounds. They have
recommended private-sector tools to implement in the public sector. Finally,
technological inventions have expedited the public sector’s implementation of NPM
tools, such as decentralization and public participation.
Moreover, studies have discussed three social factors supporting NPM:
commonalities, low public trust, and quiet performance. Scholars assume that
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commonalities, such as language, made NPM easy to expand globally. Furthermore,
public organizations were facing two main social obstacles: low public trust and quiet
performance. NPM was provided as a solution to these problems through public
participation and private-sector tools.
Economic factors
The welfare state was the dominant government system (Fornasier & Franklin,
2019). It encouraged high intervention in the economy by the government and the
provision of services and goods (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). The welfare state
emphasized the many problems of public organizations. The first problem was the
size of the government. The economy was restricted by the large public sector (Bale
& Dale, 1998). For example, U.S. government expenditures increased from $757 to
$1,872 per capita between 1949 and 1974 (Pack, 1987). In the 1970s, public spending
in the UK exceeded 40% of GDP (Ferlie, 2001). As a result, scholars were looking at
the public sector as the problem, not the solution. Therefore, governments were forced
to reform public agencies to develop the economy. For instance, there was a
movement to reverse government growth (Dunsire & Hood, 1989; Pack, 1987).
Second, financial scarcity, such as economic crises and wars, encouraged
governments to decrease expenditure (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001; Aucoin, 1990;
Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012).
For example, the Vietnam war increased U.S. taxes on citizens because the
government's spending was high (Yeboah-Assiamah et al., 2016). In 1990, Sweden
implemented NPM because of their financial crisis (Ferlie, 2017).
One of the main problems was budgetary. For instance, traditional line-item
budgeting encourages bureaucracy to prioritize spending more than saving (Kelly &
Wanna, 2000). The classic budget had many obstacles. First, it focused on inputs.
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Second, it required bureaucracy to focus on rules. This problem was related to the
classical system of public administration. The fiscal stresses were because of changes
in the international economic system (Aucoin, 1990). Third, the budgetary pressures
were a global problem. NPM introduced solutions for many of these problems. As a
result, NPM tools were used in many countries. Besides, the fiscal stresses were in
both local and federal governments. For example, some scholars assume that local
governments in the United States contract out work because of budgetary pressure
(Common, 1998). Supporters for the NPM movement have shown that NPM
introduced tools to solve economic problems. For instance, NPM suggested
downsizing the government through privatization (Aucoin, 1990). Furthermore, NPM
focuses on cost-efficiency that encourages public organizations to either self-finance
or make a profit (Lorenz, 2012).
Classic liberalism focused on the public sector, which has an autonomy that is
protected by law (Lorenz, 2012). On the other hand, neoliberalism emphasizes a
limited public sector with free-market principles. These principles are antibureaucracy
(Coccia, 2009). Both the Reagan and Thatcher governments encouraged small states
with big markets (Lorenz, 2012). Neoliberal ideology has four doctrines: free market,
private industry, management, and consumer. The free market leads to competition.
The competition will lead to high efficiency for consumers and the private sector. The
state's role is to remove all obstacles to achieve a free market.
Furthermore, the relationship between the public and the government will be
based on economic principles, not legal. For instance, citizens and the government are
both shareholders. Private industry dogma encourages the private sector to provide all
services. Management dogma focuses on efficiency. The state's job is to remove any
obstacle that affects efficiency because the private sector is well-organized. Consumer
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dogma encourages a limited government. The role of the government is to remove
barriers that influence consumers' purchasing power. The main factor is information.
Opponents assumed that if NPM was based on the performance of the
economy, NPM would be developed in countries that had poor performance (Hood,
1995). Two studies tested the relationship between the government size and
implementation of NPM. They found that this reason alone is not enough to explain
the rise of NPM. Peters and Heisler (1983) analyzed OECD countries in the 1980s.
They found that small governments, such as Japan and Turkey, showed a low rise in
NPM. However, outsized governments showed a mixed rise of NPM. Therefore, there
was no significant relationship between government size and the rising of NPM.
Political factors
Scholars have discussed four political reasons for the rise of NPM:
accountability, power, scandal, and right-wing political control. The size and
functions of public organizations were expanded. As a result, political accountability
over bureaucracy became difficult. Therefore, the public reformation became required
to create a new type of accountability (Wilenski, 1979). For instance, NPM added
public accountability and accountability for results (Ferlie, 2001; Hoque, 2005).
Second, bureaucrats increased their power over elected officials (Aucoin,
1990). For instance, elected officials had limited tools to guide bureaucracy, such as
the budget. Therefore, elected officials were looking for a reformation to decrease
bureaucratic power. NPM decreased bureaucratic power by evolving. This issue was
global, especially in democratic countries. For instance, many European countries that
have parliaments had the same problem. The parliament lost a large degree of power
to bureaucracy (Wilenski, 1979). Other scholars look at this aspect from another
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angle. They assume that bureaucrats were looking to eliminate political control
(Hood, 1995). Therefore, they used NPM tools, such as contracts.
Third, scholars have concluded that governmental scandals, such as
Watergate, created a negative public perception of bureaucracy (Fornasier & Franklin,
2019; Light, 2001). As a result, governments have worked hard to implement
reformation. After Watergate, U.S. Congress passed 30 laws to reform the
government.
Some studies show that right-wing politics raise NPM globally (Fornasier &
Franklin, 2019). For example, both the US and the UK were under right-wing
governments, under President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively, that
led the public sector reformation (Ferlie, 2001). Opponents have argued two pieces of
evidence: First, Sweden was under left-wing politics, and it has seen a high impact of
NPM. Second, Japan had a right-wing government, but it has a low NPM impact.
External inducement
External inducement happens when an external entity motivates a government
to implement an idea or strategy (Goldman & Eliason, 2003). This factor includes the
use of five tools: global entities, think tanks, advisors, emulation, educational
materials, and information and communication technology (ICT).
Global organizations, such as the World Bank, promoted NPM in many
countries by providing it as a tool to improve the public sector (Burns, Krott,
Sayadyan, & Giessen, 2017; Ferlie, 2017). Furthermore, many global loans and aid
donors, such as the IMF, require deprived states to develop their public sectors by
implementing NPM (Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Fornasier & Franklin, 2019;
Robinson, 2015). The goal of international agencies is to promote transparency and
make good government.
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Furthermore, many think tanks have supported public sector reformation
(Ferlie, 2001). Besides, some governments have included advisors from the private
sector. In the 1980s, the UK Prime Minister appointed advisors from the private
sector, such as Sir Roy Griffiths, who was a director and deputy chairman
of Sainsbury's (Ferlie, 2001). The second reason is emulation. Global changes in
public administration attract policymakers. Therefore, they emulate successful
reforms like NPM.
Additionally, an increase in books and academic articles discussing NPM has
encouraged its implementation. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) in “Who Learns What
from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature” show a fourth reason. When
policymakers face a problem, they prefer to borrow the solution from countries that
have already faced the same problem.
ICT made NPM easy to implement by providing tools that affected both the
internal processes and external relationships of public organizations (Homburg,
2004). For instance, information technology encouraged decentralization, and it
supported public organizations’ efforts to be more flexible (Larbi, 1999; Pfiffner,
2004). Furthermore, information technology empowered the public with information
and available choices (Tolofari, 2005). Moreover, ICT made NPM easy for the public
around the world to notice. As a result, the public put pressure on policymakers to
implement these reforms. For example, scholars have argued that elite universities
and research institutions support the expansion of NPM by focusing on it (Ferlie et al.,
2016).
Social factors
Social factors include three aspects: commonalities, low public trust, and quiet
performance. Some studies have assumed that NPM is an Anglo-American movement

43

(Pollitt, 1993). Scholars have compared the implementations of NPM in Englishspeaking countries and non-English speaking countries. Their view has been that
commonalities, such as language, could explain the expansion of public policy
(Castles & Merrill, 1989). They found that English-speaking countries had high NPM
implementations.
In contrast, non-English speaking countries had low NPM implementations.
However, these studies ignored the NPM implementations in other countries, such as
Hong Kong (Hood, 1995). In the 1980s, Hong Kong also implemented NPM (Lam,
1997). The second aspect is of low trust. The public has low confidence in public
organizations (Ferlie, 2017). As a result, public organizations needed reformation to
change public perspectives.
The performance of public organizations was a factor in the rise of NPM. For
example, Christopher Hood (1989) in Quo Vadis? Challenges of Public
Administration proffers that NPM was a response to public bureaucracy's failure and
its moral bankruptcy (Common, 1998). For instance, bureaucracy assumed public
managers' abilities to control workers to deliver public services quickly.
Unfortunately, this assumption failed. Therefore, NPM encouraged decentralization
and delegation (Pfiffner, 2004).
Some scholars disagree with the notion that NPM is an international paradigm
for many reasons. First, NPM implementations do not eliminate bureaucracy. For
instance, many countries around the world still use bureaucracy. Second, the reasons
to implement NPM tools are varied. Studies have found that governments have
different reasons to execute NPM. Third, NPM does not have a solid doctrine or form.
Instead, NPM has doctrine with converse meanings. For example, empowerment has
converse meanings (Hood, 1995). Empowerment denotes implementing the market
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form in public organizations, so individuals have the power to affect producers.
Otherwise, empowerment means the transfer of political power to citizens, so the
market form is not a part of this transformation.
Besides the converse meanings, NPM had used in many forms in different
times and countries (Hood, 1995). For example, in the 1970s, NPM focused on
bureaucrats' power. In the 1980s, NPM focused on customer power. Furthermore, the
UK and Australia were driven by business-type managerialism, but New Zealand was
driven by new institutional economics (Hood, 1991). Scholars assume that these
converse meanings and forms have one common thing that all were against
bureaucracy (Hood, 1995).
Public Administration and Democracy
This section discusses the relationship between democracy and both public
administration and NPM. Public administration has an essential role to either promote
or impede democracy (Box et al., 2001; Nabatchi, 2009). For instance, public
administration has a role in educating citizens about government. Education maintains
and promotes democracy in society. Second, bureaucracy participates in making the
public less engaged. Third, the new movements in public administration, NPM, and
post-NPM, require high public engagement.
Scholars believe that NPM does not address democratic values directly
(Christensen & Laegreid, 2011). Therefore, scholars analyzed NPM in-depth to find
the correlation between NPM and democratic values. Scholars have discussed three
findings. First, NPM enhances democracy in two ways: output democracy and fire
alarm. Studies have examined two types of democracy: input and output (also called
participatory democracy). The input democratic model, also called representative
democracy, assumes that the government is a united entity, and the public deregulate
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their authority to the elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019). Elected officials
implement their roles to direct the bureaucracy.
Output democracy happens when there is a direct connection between the
public and the bureaucracy. NPM makes a shift from input democracy to output
democracy (Dunn & Miller, 2007). Moreover, the core of democracy is that the
government is community-owned (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Therefore,
empowering citizens encourages democracy.
Another evidence is that public involvement increases political accountability
by working as a fire alarm (West, 2004). For instance, the public may play an
overseeing role to ensure that bureaucrats are responsive to elected officials.
Therefore, NPM provides a new tool of oversight for elected officials to control
bureaucrats and maintain democracy.
Second, scholars believe that NPM threatens democracy through procedural
accountability. Democracy requires political accountability; bureaucrats are
responsible directly and indirectly to elected officials (Fornasier & Franklin, 2019;
West, 2004). NPM provides two types of accountability: procedural and outcomes
accountability. Procedural accountability demands bureaucrats to address public
comments in making public policy. At the same time, outcomes accountability
emphasizes that a bureaucrat is accountable to the agency’s outcomes. Therefore, the
market mechanism reduces responsibility to both the elected officials and the law
(Fatemi & Behmanesh, 2012; Kelly, 1998; Terry, 1998). Market mechanism transfers
public servants' accountability from elected officials and law to the public.
NPM's Evaluation
Many studies have evaluated NPM values. NPM assumes that including
citizens increases service quality. Scholars have criticized this assumption in many
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ways. First, this assumption requires informed citizens (Box et al., 2001). This
requirement is impossible because citizens do not have enough knowledge on every
public issue. Furthermore, they do not have enough resources, such as time. Besides,
some studies have found that bureaucrats prefer to contract out rather than including
citizens. They assume that contracting out makes quality high.
NPM also assumes an increase in the quality of public services. Therefore,
Dixon and Hood (2016) theorized that public complaints would be lower if public
service quality increased. So they analyzed public complaints about public services in
the UK between 1975 and 2005. They found that public complaints had increased.
Most complaints were about the fairness of rules and consistency of rules for the same
cases. Some scholars criticized this study. They explained the rise occurred because
complaint methods became more comfortable for the citizen to use. For example, new
technology, such as the internet, made complaints easier. Therefore, the increase in
complaints was not because of NPM. Dixon and Hood refuted this critique. The
increase was not in all public organizations. Thus, the increase was not because of the
ease of complaints but because of the decrease in public service quality.
Dixon and Hood further discussed cost-cutting in NPM. They analyzed the
running cost for both the UK civil department and general administration costs for
local governments between 1980 and 2011. Running cost included the organization's
regular expenditure, such as human resources, utilities, and rent. In the UK, the
running cost is considered an essential element of treasury control. They found this
increased by almost double. They analyzed the increase and found that the number of
public servants decreased by one third, but the wage expenditures were the same.
Therefore, public servants' wages were increasing more than the rate of inflation. The
increase involved two aspects: consultants and contracting out. Moreover, studies
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analyzed two public functions: water distribution and waste collection. They found
there was not any cost-saving for these areas.
Post-New Public Management
Criticisms of the NPM theory include concerns over elements such as
efficiency and the low quality of public service. As a result, scholars have supported a
new reform called post-new public management. Critics maintain that the NPM has
several limitations. First, NPM decreases the political control among bureaucrats
(Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000) and has said that high self-control or decentralization does
not fit democratic practices. For instance, Zanetti and Adams (2000) believe that
implementing market values in public organizations under a democratic regime would
damage democracy and prevent market control. The result is fragmented public
organizations that put more pressure on bureaucrats to manage and increase their
capacity. Second, global issues, such as terrorism and economic crises, grew the
desire to centralize a system for public organizations (Hammond, 2007; Ventriss,
2013).
Post-NPM has four associated doctrines. First, post-NPM increases political
domination among bureaucrats. For instance, post-NPM increases the capacity at the
top levels. The second doctrine is governance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018). Governance
introduces a broad picture for the public sector by linking the public sector with all
institutions that affect it, such as political and social environments (Kettl, 2002). The
third doctrine emphasizes the relationship between public organizations and service to
the public. The fourth doctrine is performance (Reiter & Klenk, 2018).
Two main theories have shaped post-NPM: institutionalism and networks
(Frederickson, Kevin, Christ, & Licari, 2015). Institutionalism focuses on collective
action by political and social organizations alongside public organizations. Therefore,
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these organizations work together with a mix of conflicts, interests, and competition.
Network management has three main perspectives (Hwang & Moon, 2008). The first
perspective is interest intermediation, which assumes that organizations can find a
common goal when they work together. The second perspective is being a
government tool, as network management supports the government in implementing
policies. The third perspective is information; network management endorses the
transfer of data between organizations.
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Chapter Three
Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia
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Abstract
This chapter discusses four main aspects. First, it discusses the reformation
history of public organizations in Saudi Arabia. Local and global organizations have
provided recommendations to improve the public sector in Saudi Arabia (Dobe,
2008). The other three aspects discuss the dissertation’s sample: the Housing
Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Commerce Ministry.
The housing issue in Saudi Arabia has three stages. The first stage was
between 1953-1974. This stage had two features. First, there was no agency
responsible for housing. Second, public housing projects were focused on employees
and in limited cities (Saleh, 1998). The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. The
government established three agencies to accelerate the building of houses: the Real
Estate Development Fund (REDF), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing
(MPWH), and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) (Al-Mayouf &
Al-Khayyal, 2011). REDF provided free-interest loans for citizens to build their
houses. MPWH offered ready units. MPMRA afforded free land to citizens (Alasmari,
2018).
The third stage has been from 2011 until the current day. In 2011, the
government created the Housing Ministry (Kyriazis et al. 2018). The Housing
Ministry provided many projects through collaboration with the private sector to
support citizens in owning their homes.
In 1950, the Saudi government established the Health Ministry (Khaliq, 2012).
Studies showed that the reformation of the Health Ministry happened through three
stages. First, the Health Ministry was focusing on curative activities. In 1978, the
Health Ministry created primary health care (PHC) centers (Sebai et al. 2001). PHC
centers supported the Health Ministry to include preventive operations to the
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ministry’s goals. In 1993, the Health Ministry worked to change its role from
providing health care services to regulate it (Khaliq, 2012).
The Reformation of Public Organizations in Saudi Arabia
The government of Saudi Arabia works hard to improve public services.
Therefore, the reformation of public administration has a long history in Saudi Arabia.
The central aspect to discuss regarding the reformation of public organizations is
whether the source is internal or external. For instance, the government of Saudi
Arabia has created some public organizations to oversee and improve the public
sector in Saudi Arabia. Specifically, the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) was
designed to develop public organizations by training public employees. In the 1950s,
the Saudi government faced a fiscal problem. It asked for financial support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF then provided restricted support to the
Saudi government. The Saudi government was required to make economic
development plans and increase revenue resources (Al-Harthi, 2001).
The first reformation plan occurred in July 1927 with the creation of the
Commission on Inspection and Reform (Huyette, 1985). The primary goal for the
commission was to review administrative systems and recommend reforms. This
commission's outcomes focused on reforming the Consultative Council to have eight
members and to meet twice weekly. Furthermore, the commission clearly defined the
Consultative Council's tasks to include reviewing budgetary questions, new economic
projects, expropriation of property for public utilities, enactment of laws and statutes,
and employment of foreign nationals. In this period, the government's shape was not
modern because there was no central body controlling public agencies (Dobe, 2008).
In 1953, the government created the Council of Ministers (Harrington, 1958).
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In the early stages, international organizations played an essential role in
improving public organizations because Saudis lacked education and skills (Dobe,
2008). In 1957, the KSA faced a financial crisis, so it asked the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to study the situation and introduce some advice to solve the
fiscal problems. The IMF made recommendations that many governments
subsequently implemented. In 1960, the government of Saudi Arabia asked the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for help creating an
economic plan to generate different resources of revenue instead of oil. The main
recommendation was to establish a central public organization for planning, which
had three primary goals: making and supervising development plans, rearranging
public organizations, and localizing human resources. In the same year, the
government of Saudi Arabia asked the United Nations (UN) to send a consultant to
study the administrative situation within the country, and the expert introduced four
recommendations. The recommendations included merging similar public
organizations, improving the financial control system in public organizations,
simplifying the administrative process—especially in the procurement system—and
establishing a training center to educate public employees, which eventually became
the Institute of Public Administration (IPA).
The History of the Housing Issue in Saudi Arabia
In 1938, oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia (Hitti & Abed, 1974). The
discovery improved the country's economy. Furthermore, it encouraged the
government to make a modern society by building modern cities. This section focuses
on the history of housing solutions in Saudi Arabia. Scholars have discussed them
occurring in three stages.
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The first stage was between 1953-1974. This stage had three features: no
specific public agency for housing, a focus on employees, and limited cities. The
second stage was between 1974-2011. The third stage is from 2011 to the present. In
this stage, the government created a ministry for housing. The government offered
three ways to solve the housing problem: building houses, zero-interest loans, and free
land.
The first stage (1953-1974)
The first stage was between 1953-1974. Two factors encouraged the
government to intervene in housing issues: discovering oil and immigration to urban
areas. Finding oil supported the economy. For instance, government revenue
increased from $334 million in 1960 to $4.216 billion in 1973. Besides, there was a
boost in populations of urban areas (Saleh, 1998). Between 1950 and 1974, Riyadh's
population increased from 111,000 to 651,000.
This stage had two main housing projects: the Arabian American Oil
Company's (ARAMCO) programs and the Al-Malaz Project. ARAMCO had a vast
number of employees. For instance, in 1951, they numbered 22,395 (Fadan, 1983).
The company faced a problem with shelter because the oil fields were far from the
cities. Therefore, in 1953, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) created
three programs to support the housing sector (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). The
first program was the Home Ownership Program. The Home Ownership Program was
a collaboration between the government and ARAMCO. The government provided
free land for ARAMCO's employees (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011). At the same
time, if any employee needed a loan, ARAMCO offered a Housing Loan Plan, which
included zero-interest loans for its employees. The third program was the Guarantee
Rental Plan. This program supported real estate companies. If any company failed to
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sell its houses, ARAMCO would pay the rent for up to five years. In 1952, ARAMCO
encouraged contractors to build 300 homes (Fadan, 1983). ARAMCO programs
focused on oil sites in the Eastern Province (Al-Mayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011).
In 1953, the Saudi government moved the ministries and offices from Jeddah
to Riyadh. The government announced the Al-Malaz Project to build houses for
public employees. This project had two goals. The first goal was to motivate public
employees to transfer to Riyadh (Fadan, 1983). The second goal was to solve shelter
scarcity. At the same time, there was no governmental agency for housing. Therefore,
the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in cooperation created the general
administration for housing that was responsible for this project (Mortada, 2008).
Consequently, they hired foreign experts to do the project. The project
included 754 detached home units and three buildings that contained 180 apartment
units. Also, the project provided public services.
The second stage (1974-2011)
The second stage was between 1974 and 2011. In this stage, the government
created three public entities to support citizens to own their homes. As a result, house
projects expanded to include all cities and villages in the country. Furthermore,
government spending was high. For instance, between 1975 and 1980, the
government allocated $24 billion to build 300,000 housing units (Mubarak, 1999). In
1974, the Saudi government created the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF; AlMayouf & Al-Khayyal, 2011; Alhubashi & Cladera, 2016). The REDF provided zerointerest loans for the public to build their own homes. In 1975, the government
established the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) and the Ministry of
Municipal and Rural Affairs (MOMRA). MOMRA launched a program to provide
free land for citizens (Alasmari, 2018).
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In 1974, the Saudi government established the Real Estate Development Fund
(REDF). It is a public agency that aims to provide interest-free loans for the public. It
began with 250 million riyals, almost $70 million. In the same year, the government
increased its initial capital to 9 billion riyals, or $2.4 billion. In 1990, the value of
REDF was almost 74 billion riyals, or nearly $20 billion. The first program for REDF
was to provide interest-free loans for citizens to build their private homes. Citizens
would repay the loan over 25 years.
The REDF categorized the loan amounts in three levels. The first level was
300,000 riyals, $80,000 for major cities. The second level was 250,000 riyals,
$66,667 for towns. The third level was 200,000 riyals, $53,333 for small villages. The
REDF provided the loan in four installments. First, the borrower received 10% of the
loan when he signed the agreement. Next, he/she received 40% when the concrete
framework was done. The third installment was 40% when they finished all the
masonry work. When the house was done, they would receive the last payment of
10%.
The REDF offered a 20% discount for borrowers who repaid the loan
regularly. Furthermore, there was an additional 10% discount for borrowers who
repaid the total loan at once. Until 1988, the REDF had supported the building of
440,446 houses. The commitment percentage of repayment was 93%.
In 1975, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MPWH) replaced the
General Administration for Housing (Mortada, 2008). MPWH provided two types of
projects: rush housing and regular housing. The ministry focused on nine major cities.
In the 1970s and 1980s, MPWH built rush public housing projects in three
main cities: Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah (Mortada, 2008). These projects were
high-rise towers. They had 4,752 units with an average area of 230 m2 (2,475 ft2).
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These projects were ready in 1980 but remained unoccupied for eleven years. The
citizens refused to live there because the housing options were not appropriate for
Saudi families. For instance, the size of the housing units was small, and the average
family size was big.
Furthermore, Saudi culture does not prefer living in apartments. In 1990-1991,
Kuwaiti citizens used these projects as a shelter because of the Iraq War. After the
war, the ministry gave these projects to REDF to provide them to qualified citizens.
Besides the rush housing, MPWH built regular housing. This type focused on
low-rise apartments and separated houses (Mortada, 2008). For instance, they were on
one floor. The regular housing projects provided 9,934 apartments and 10,516 homes.
In 2001, the total units were 24,540, and MPWH was brought down.
The Third stage (2011-current)
The third stage is from 2011 until now. In 2011, King Abdullah decreed the
Ministry of Housing (MoH). As a result, the MoH became responsible for residential
shelter, and it included the REDF (Kyriazis et al. 2018).
The Ministry of Housing has 12 programs and initiatives. The main initiative
is called Sakani, which means my home in English. This initiative aims to support
citizens to have their own homes by providing many programs and paying entirely or
partially the interest rate of real estate loans. It works through participation with
financial institutions. It offers nine solutions.
The first solution is that citizens can buy their homes directly from the market.
Until January 2019, the ministry accepted 25,731 such requests. The second solution
is that the citizen can build his own home with financial support from the ministry. In
January 2019, the ministry accepted 285,000 such requests. The third solution
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involves units under construction. The ministry agreed to 264,670 such demands until
January 2019.
The fourth solution is the ministry's constructed units. The fifth solution is
converting current real estate loans to supported loans. The sixth solution is free land.
The ministry offers free lands in some cities. These free lands are restricted to be built
on in one year, or the citizen loses them. The ministry distributed 207,296 lands. The
seventh solution is an additional loan for the current military. Besides 500,000 SAR,
current military members can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR.
The eighth solution is an additional loan for citizens 50 years old and above. Besides
500,000 SAR, they can have 20% of their real estate value up to 140,000 SAR. The
ninth solution is paying a value-added tax of up to 42,500 SAR.
The Health System in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has been provided with health care services since 1926 (Khaliq,
2012). In 1926, the government created the health directorate in Jeddah. The health
care system was limited. It was just in Mecca and Jeddah. In 1927, the government
changed the name to be the Directorate of General Health and Ambulances and
expanded its authority to include the whole country (Khaliq, 2012; Ram, 2014). In
1950, it became the Ministry of Health. In 1970, the government announced the first
five-years national health plan (Ram, 2014).
In 1997, the Saudi health care system ranked 26th (The World Health
Organization, 2000; Al-Yousuf et al., 2002; Khaliq, 2012). Both the public and
private sectors provide health care services. The public sector offers public health
services directly and indirectly. Directly, the Health Ministry is responsible for the
health care system. Besides, other governmental entities, such as the Education
Ministry and National Guard health affairs, provide health care services for their
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employees and their families (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). In emergency cases, these
governmental entities expand their health care services to include all citizens (Mutfi,
2000).
The private sector provides health care services during private hospitals,
clinics, and pharmacies (Al-Yousuf et al., 2002). Private health care services exist in
big cities. The health system has three levels: primary, advance, and specialist
(Almalki et al. 2011; Al-Yousuf et al. 2002). Primary health care (PHC) centers
provide primary health care services. PHC system was created in 1978. If a patient
needs advance retreatment, the doctor transferred the patient to an advanced hospital.
Besides the advanced hospitals, there are specialized hospitals.
The Health Ministry
In 1950, the Saudi government created the Health Ministry to provide health
care services directly to citizens (Almalki et al. 2011). The ministry provides vital
health care services, approximately 60% (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Sebai et al. 2001;
Ram, 2014). Furthermore, it has four other functions: making strategic health plans,
formulating health policies, super health programs, and controlling all health activities
(Al-Yousuf et al. 2002; Ram, 2014). The functions require a decentralized structure.
The ministry divides the country into twenty regions (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002).
Each area has a health director who is responsible for the health care service in the
region. Each area has many sections.
Scholars discussed three stages for the Health Ministry: curative, preventive,
and regulative. The curative stage was between 1950 and 1978, and the ministry was
focusing on therapeutic activities. There were limited preventive programs, such as a
campaign against malaria in the eastern province in the 1950s (Al-Yousuf et al. 2002).
This campaign was in collaboration between ARAMCO, WHO, and the Health

59

Ministry (Sebai et al. 2001). Curative is necessary, but without preventive, it costs
highly.
In 1978, the ministry made plans to prevent diseases, such as malaria.
Therefore, the ministry began to establish PHC centers. PHC has five main tasks.
First, PHC is responsible for educating the public about three main issues: diseases,
water, food. Diseases’ knowledge includes conditions and reasons. Moreover, it
informs how the public can avoid infections. Water education includes how safe water
is essential. The food topic discusses proper nutrition. Second, PHC centers provide
maternal and child health care.
Third, PHC works to increase the percent of the public who are vaccine.
Fourth, PHC centers deal with regional pandemics. Finally, PHC provides treatment
for common diseases.
At the end of the 1980s, 10% of PHC activities focused on preventing diseases
(Sebai et al. 2001). Therefore, the strategic health plan, between 1990 and 1995,
emphasized preventative actions. In the 1990s, the number of hospital patients
decreased by up to 40% (Sebai et al. 2001; Khoja et al. 1997). In 2009, there were
1925 PHC centers in the country (Khaliq, 2012).
In 2009, the Health Ministry had 2037 PHC centers, and they received 82% of
visitors for all health providers. PHC centers contribute that each citizen has a health
record. The health record system reduced the health care cost because it prevents the
duplication of consultation.
The Health Ministry budget is enormous. Between 2005 and 2009, the
ministry’s budget average was almost 6% of the country's budget. Therefore, the
ministry is highly costly, and it provides free health care services for the public. Thus,
the third stage’s goal was to minimize the governmental health care services bill

60

(Khaliq, 2012). This stage emphasized three main steps: health insurance,
privatization, and electronic health services.
In 1993, the government created the Saudi Commission for Health Specialties
(SCHS) (Khaliq, 2012). SCHS is responsible for supervising, regulating, and
accrediting all health training programs. Moreover, SCHS is responsible for issuing
and renewing healthcare professionals' licenses (AlBaker et al. 2017).
The Health Ministry stressed the co-operative health insurance system (Sebai
et al. 2001). In 1999, the government established the Council of Cooperative Health
Insurance (CCHI). The council aims to create, regulate, and oversee health insurance
strategies. The council recommended a plan to have health insurance for the public,
which became the Cooperative Health Insurance Act of 2003 (Khaliq, 20120
The act has three stages of implementing health insurance for the public in the
country. The first stage focused on employees in the private sector, and the employers
pay the cost of health insurance. The council divided this stage into three phases. The
first phase focused on the private sector, with more than 499 employees. Second, the
Council included companies with more than one hundred employees. Finally, all
employees in the private sector were insured. This stage was implemented
completely. In 2010, CCHI reported that 8.4 million insured individuals (Khaliq,
2012).
The second stage expands the insured employees by including the public
sector employees, and the government pays health insurance costs. The third stage
aims to include other groups, such as tourism.
The ministry implemented privatization in two strategies, either sell or rent
public hospitals, and both ways have advantages and disadvantages (Walston et al.
2008). The main benefits are financial and management. It decreased government
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expenditures on health care services. Moreover, the decision making is faster.
Conversely, the private sector focuses on thriving cities, the main cities, so there is a
concern about the rural areas.
The ministry implemented electronic health services to automate all health
services and requirements. In 2008, the ministry announced a four-year plan to
develop electronic health care services with a $1.1 billion budget (Bah et al. 2011). As
a result, the ministry announced many electronic systems. The first system is the
Health Information System (HIS) (Ram, 2014). The system is comprehensive, and it
has two goals. First, each patient should have an electronic health file. Second, each
hospital has an electronic system, and the system connects all hospitals. The second
system is the Bed Management System (Ram, 2014). The system manages the
capacity of each hospital to guide referral decisions.
Ministry of Commerce
In 1946, the government established the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce &
Industry to administrate the commerce. Its goal was to protect local products. In 1954,
the government created the Ministry of Commerce and expanded its tasks (Niblock,
2004). In 2003, the ministry became the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In 2016,
the ministry changed to be the Ministry of Commerce and Investment. In 2020, it
became the Ministry of Commerce.
The ministry has many functions, but there are two main functions. First, it is
accountable for checking the safety and quality of goods and products to ensure that
they are safe for the public (Almutairi et al. 2015). Second, the ministry is responsible
for protecting the public from fraud and deception (Almutairi et al. 2015). Some of
the ministry functions are a collaboration with other public entities. For example,
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Chapter Four
Methodology
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Abstract
As established in the first chapter, this study aims to determine if
governmental type affects New Public Management (NPM) implementation,
especially when a government has controversial values. For instance, the literature
found that NPM is reliant on democratic values, such as openness. At the same time,
non-democratic governments do not believe in democratic values. Therefore, a
conversion happens when a non-democratic government implements NPM. Ignoring
the NPM democratic values limits the impact of NPM, especially with respect to
openness. This study uses openness and public participation as synonyms.
As such, the testable hypothesis is that when a non-democratic state
implements NPM, openness or citizen participation will not increase. There are three
possible outcomes in the relationship between the NPM index and openness score: a
positive relationship, a negative relationship, and no relationship. A positive
relationship between the NPM Index and openness score would indicate that an
increase in the NPM Index leads to an increase in openness. In this case, the
hypothesis would be rejected. A negative relationship between the NPM Index and
openness would indicate that an increase in the NPM Index leads to a decrease in
openness. Should the results show no connection between the NPM Index and
openness, the dissertation hypothesis would be accepted.
In this study, the independent variable is NPM implementations, and openness
is the dependent variable. The primary method for testing this hypothesis is a case
study of NPM implementation among ministries in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi
Arabia is a non-democratic country, this study predicts that government ministries
will ignore the openness dimension of NPM.
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The study population consists of 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia, and the unit of
analysis the ministerial organizations. The study is cross-sectional and uses the
ministries’ most recent annual reports (2017) to count four things for each ministry: a
total of public programs, PPP programs, performance measurements, and contracted
employees. This study examines the efforts of 3 of the 25 ministries to implement
NPM. They are the Ministry of Commerce, the Health Ministry, and the Housing
Ministry.
The three agencies are the sample and were selected for two reasons. First, it
focused on those ministries that provide essential services and goods for the public.
For instance, the Ministry of Commerce is responsible for the state economy and all
products sold in the country. The Health Ministry is responsible for all health services
in the country, and the Housing Ministry is responsible for all real estate transactions
and issues. Furthermore, these ministries provide various services so that the study
may find various public participation. Secondly, resource limitations for the study
limited the analysis to just three ministries. For instance, these ministries provide their
annual reports on their websites.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section
explains the study's three variables: the NPM implementations, openness, and the
government type. Moreover, it describes the measurements. The NPM
implementations were measured by creating the NPM Index. Furthermore, this
dissertation used PPS to measure openness. This study used the Political Regime
Index dataset provided by Our World in Data to measure the type of government. The
second section discusses the data collection instrument. The researcher created a form
to gather data from the ministries’ annual reports. Finally, the section shows the data
analysis for each ministry and the score for the independent and dependent variables.
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The Variables and Measurements
This dissertation has two main variables. The first variable is the NPM
implementations, which is the independent variable. This variable was measured by
the NPM Index, which focuses on three aspects: PPP, PM, and PST. The second
variable is openness, which is the dependent variable. The researcher has permission
from the international association for public participation to use its Public
Participation Spectrum (PPS). The Political Regime Index was used to explain the
kind of Saudi government.
The NPM Implementations
This study drew on three main qualities of NPM to create a new measure
referred to as an NPM Index to measure the independent variable of NPM
implementation. The first element of this index is the degree of collaboration between
the public and private sectors, which is called Public-Private Participation (PPP). The
second element is the degree of the shift to focus on performance measurements
instead of procedures. In the study, this is called Performance Measurement (PM).
The third element of the index is the degree to which a public agency implements
private-sector tools (PST). This dissertation used an inductive approach to code the
variable. For instance, the researcher read the annual reports for any word terms to
PPP, such as collaboration. At the same time, the researcher went profoundly and read
the details of each program to ensure if the program belongs to PPP or not. This index
was used to measure NPM implementation for the three selected ministries. Each
factor was given a score out of 100, and then the three scores were averaged. The next
section describes this index in more detail.
The first component of the NPM Index is government collaboration with the
private sector or public-private participation (PPP). There are two main types of PPP.
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The first type occurs when the private sector collaborates with the public sector to
provide goods or services. The second type is privatization. For this study, we are
primarily concerned with the first type. The PPP score for each ministry is therefore
based on the private-sector contribution to providing that ministry's primary service.
There are three ways to measure the private-sector contribution: percentage of
buildings, percentage of beneficiaries, and percentage of staff. The percentage of
buildings calculates PPP based on the percentage of facilities that the private sector
owns. The second two methods calculate PPP based on what percentage of
beneficiaries the private sector serves and what percentage of the staff is the private
sector, respectively.
For example, the Health Ministry’s primary task is to provide health services.
In Saudi Arabia, there are two main types of hospitals: public and private. Therefore,
the PPP score can be measured based on what percentage of all hospitals are private.
Alternatively, the ratio of beds in private hospitals versus the number of hospital beds
total is another way to measure the PPP score. The rate of total hospital staff working
in private hospitals is yet another alternative for measuring the PPP score. This study
uses the ratio of beneficiaries because this allows for a standard measurement across
the selected ministries. Therefore the PPP equation used in this study is
𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠

∗ 100.

The second NPM Index component is performance measurement (PM).
Propper and Wilson (2003) have defined performance measurements in three ways:
outputs, outcomes, or impacts, and results in linking resources and outcomes. The PM
score for this study is based on the percentage of the organization’s programs that
have performance measurements. The PM score was calculated by comparing the
number of public programs with performance measurements to the total number of
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available programs: PM score =

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑀
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠

∗ 100. This information can be

found in government reports because, in 2015, the Saudi government created The
National Center for Performance Measurement (ADAA) (ADAA is an Arabic word
means performance by English). The main goal for the ADAA was to increase public
sector efficiency by supporting the creation of performance measurements for public
organizations. As of 2017, each ministry is required to work with ADAA and must
include performance measurements in their annual reports.
The third NPM Index component measures the use of private-sector tools
(PST) in public organizations. Scholars discussed many private-sector tools, such as
job security and performance-related pay (Emery & Giauque, 2003). For instance,
NPM encourages public organizations to implement the annual contract and reward
system like the private sector. Both strategies cannot be implemented with the current
merit system in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the first step is to have employees with an
annual contract. Annual contract eliminates job security and allows the public sector
to pay based on performance (Rasheed, 2018).
The private sector offers contracted jobs while the public sector often provides
jobs for life (through the "merit system"). However, some Saudi ministries use both
merit and contract systems in hiring public employees. The public contract system
implements private-sector tools through the requirements and incentives for positions.
The contract system allows public organizations to implement private-sector tools,
which are emphasized by NPM. Therefore, this component is measured as
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠

∗ 100.

Openness
This study examined openness, which is the stand-in for the dependent
variable of democratic values in NPM. The Public Participation Spectrum (PPS) is
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used to quantify openness in each ministry. The International Association for Public
Participation created this instrument, and it permitted the researcher to use it (See
Appendix III). PPS has five levels of public participation: Inform, Consult, Involve,
Collaborate, and Empower. Every level has more public participation than the
previous level (Nelimarkka et al. 2014).
The first level, Inform, indicates that the ministry provides information to the
public about its goods and services. The second level, Consult, means that the
ministry actively seeks public feedback. The third level, Involve, indicates a ministry
that involves the public in their work and considers the publics' concerns. The fourth
level, Collaboration, marks a ministry that sees the public as a partner, working
together at each step of decision-making. The highest level, Empowerment, indicates
that the public has the right to make decisions instead of the ministry itself (Jami &
Walsh, 2014).
The PPS was used to assign a value for each level. For instance, the lowest
level, inform, was given 20 points, and 20 points were added for each higher level.
The highest point value is 100 for the empower level. For example, if a ministry
implemented a method categorized as being at the consult level, it counts 40 points.
The researcher analyzed all ministries' strategies and ranked them to PPS levels based
on each level's definition (See Appendix I).
In this study, a Ministry receives 20 points for each level of openness
achieved. Appendix I shows some examples for assigned values. The total points were
divided by the total number of examples to determine the PPS level average for each
ministry. Finally, the total points for all levels were summed and divided by the
number of methods to compute each ministry's openness score.
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The Saudi Government type.
The Political Regime Index was used to establish the current state of
democracy in Saudi Arable. The Political Regime Index is based on data from
Wimmer and Min (2006) and the Center for Systemic Peace and was most recently
updated in 2015. It measures the political regime of most countries on a scale from 10 to +10. A +10 score indicates an entirely democratic government, while a -10
score indicates an entirely non-democratic state. Saudi Arabia scored -10 on the
political regime scale, classifying it as a non-democratic country. This study is
focused on non-democratic governments. Therefore, the Political Regime Index
provided evidence that Saudi Arabia is appropriate for this study.
Data Collection Instrument
The researcher designed a data collection instrument (DCI) to parse the large
amount of information provided by each ministries' annual report, publicly available
information on each ministry website. This instrument is contained in Appendix II.
The DCI has two main parts: NPM Index information and PPS data. For the NPM
Index section, five key data points were calculated for each ministry: the number of
programs, PPP programs, programs with performance measurements, the total number
of ministry employees, and the number of contracted employees. For the PPS data
section, all methods the ministry used in 2017 to involve the public were recorded.
Each method's type was then determined and scored. The DCI ignored any repetition
in each technique. For instance, if a ministry used any technique more than once, it
was counted as one instance in the DCI.
Data Analysis
This section shows the collected data for each Saudi ministry.
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The Housing Ministry
In 2010, the Saudi government created the Housing Ministry to increase the
percentage of citizens who own shelter. In 2017, four programs contributed toward
this goal, making beneficiaries. First, the Ready Shelter program provides shelters
built by the ministry, with reasonable prices and low monthly payments. In 2017, this
program provided 10,255 housing units. Second, the Developmental Housing
Program provides shelters for poor people. In 2017 this program provided 32 shelters.
The ministry independently runs these two programs, meaning it offered 10,287 units
without any collaboration with the private sector in 2017. The third program, the OffPlan Sales Program, provides unbuilt shelters. This program allows future owners to
choose their housing layout and location. This program provided 110,150 units in
2017.
Fourth, the Supported Loan Program allows citizens to obtain a real estate
loan from any financial institution and have the ministry pay the interest rate. The
amount of support provided is dependent on a family's size and monthly income. In
2017, this program supported 85,000 units. The private sector contributed to 195,150
units out of 205,437 total provided by the Ministry (95%) through these programs.
The PPP score is 95 out of 100 (Appendix IV).

Similar to the other two

ministries, the annual report included the output of each program. Therefore, the PM
score is 100 out of 100 (Appendix IV). The Housing Ministry hired both merit and
contracted employees, with contracted employees making up 52% of the almost 2000
total employees in 2017. This gives a very high NPM Index score of 82 (Appendix
IV).
As with the Ministry of Commerce, the annual report for the Housing Ministry
divided the relationship between the Ministry and the public into three aspects: new
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media, traditional media, and call centers. First, the Ministry used social media and
short videos to inform the public about ministry programs. The Ministry’s social
media accounts had 45,000 followers, and these accounts wrote more than 460,000
tweets and answers. The Ministry’s social media videos were watched one million
times. Additionally, the Ministry created a unique website, email, and contact form
for each program. In terms of traditional media, the ministry’s staff participated in 65
TV interviews and provided 15 workshops, which 2500 citizens participated in the
workshops. Finally, the ministry's call center received 14,926 calls in 2017. As a
result, the Housing Ministry has a low PPS score of 30 out of 100 (Appendix V).
Based on PPS, the Housing Ministry obtained public feedback and consulted them.
The Health Ministry.
In determining the health ministry's NPM Index, PPP was established by
examining the public and private percentages of hospital beneficiaries nationally. The
hospital beneficiaries were calculated based on hospital beds. In 2017, the private
sector made up 17,622 hospital beds out of 72,981 totals, or 24%. Similar to the
Ministry of Commerce, the annual report shows the achievements of each department
and program. Therefore, the PM score is 100. The Health Ministry uses a contract
system called the Autonomous Recruitment system (AR). In 2017, the Ministry had
10,208 private contract employees out of 51,935 in the AR system, or about 20%.
Averaging these three factors, the NPM Index score is (

24+100+20
3

) = 48 out of 100, or

a medium level of NPM implementation (Appendix VI).
The Health Ministry's public involvement efforts are focused primarily on an
informal level, such as its website. Further steps included various public campaigns,
reports, information graphics, phone medical consultations, and short videos. In the
consultation effort, the ministry distributed surveys and received public comments
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about its programs. Appendix I was used to calculate the PPS score. The Health
Ministry scores low on the PPS: 26 out of 100, which means that the ministry
included the public as consulters (Appendix VII). Furthermore, the ministry obtained
public feedback on its programs.
The Ministry of Commerce
The Ministry of Commerce had 23 primary services and 52 total services
(Annual Report, 2018). The ministry provides services for both citizens and the
private sector. The annual ministry report did not show any collaboration with the
private sector to deliver public services; the ministry provided all services
independently. While the ministry did collaborate with financial institutions to change
one regulation, this was not counted, as PPP focuses on the private sector providing
services or support in lieu of the ministry.
The annual report discussed several instances of collaboration with other
ministries or global organizations. However, there were no instances of local
cooperation with either citizens or the private sector. Therefore, the PPP score for the
Ministry of Commerce was zero (Appendix VIII).
As for performance measurements, the annual report included a section called
"Achievements," which focused on the output of each program. Furthermore, the
Annual report compared some results with the last ten years. Also, it included various
tables and charts to simplify and summarize information for the public. Therefore, the
ministry’s score is 100% (Appendix VIII).
Based on the Annual Report, the Ministry of Commerce had 807 employees,
all of whom were employed through the merit system, i.e., 0% contracted employees,
leading to a PST of 0. The scores from each of these factors were averaged, resulting
in the NPM Index for the Ministry of Commerce: (
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0+100+0
3

) = 33% (Appendix VIII).

This score means that the ministry has a low NPM Index. A low NPM score means
that, in 2017, the ministry implemented high bureaucracy activities and low NPM
activities.
The Ministry of Commerce divides its relationship with the public into three
components: new media, public relations, and marketing. In terms of new media, the
Ministry completed 33 public campaigns on social media, served 20,000 beneficiaries
through social media, and collaborated with 32 social media celebrities. Additionally,
it created a YouTube channel to support deaf people. The ministry activities in this
component were categorized as social media because these activities were based on
social media, either Twitter or Youtube. Furthermore, these activities informed the
public about ministry services.
The public relations arm of the Ministry of Commerce facilitated a variety of
public participation programs. Moreover, these programs were either to inform the
public or to consult them. For instance, representatives from the Ministry gave 115
TV and Radio interviews and published 144 newspaper comments, in addition to the
33 public campaigns and 164 newspaper articles put out by the Ministry. They also
created a cellphone app for the Ministry, and its call center received and answered
1500 traditional phone calls. The marketing section of the Ministry contributed 619
infographics, nine motion graphics, and 19 videos. The previous programs provided
information for the public.
The Ministry received feedback on its programs through an online feedback
form on its main website, surveys, and email. Appendix I lists each public
participation method that the Ministry offered. Furthermore, each technique scored
based on SSP (Appendix I). The Ministry scored 27 out of 100, meaning it scored low
on the public participation spectrum (Appendix IX). A low PPS implies that the
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ministry consulted the public and obtained general feedback on analysis, alternatives,
and decisions.
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Chapter Five
Results and Discussion
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Abstract
This chapter has two primary purposes. First, it reports and discusses the
results and the values of the variables. Second, it examines if there is a correlation
between the variables. It also discusses the results relative to previous research.
Results and Discussion
Appendix X shows the ministries’ PPP, PM, PST, and NPM Index. The
appendix X shows a significant difference in PPP scores. For instance, the Housing
ministry had 94 points, which means that the ministry frequently collaborates with the
private sector. On the other hand, the Commerce Ministry had no collaboration with
the private sector, with zero points. The Health Ministry had 24 points because the
private sector partially provides health services.
Chapter two discussed three main reasons public organizations collaborate
with the private sector: global institutions, governmental desire, and the revolving
door. The first two reasons may provide a reasonable partial explanation for the
sample because they should affect all ministries to collaborate with the private sector.
The revolving door theory provides the best explanation by focusing on the
individual profile for the ministers. Based on the ministers’ curriculum vitae, the
Housing Minister had experience in the private sector, but other ministers did not.
Another element that may explain the PPP scores is the strength of the private
sector. For instance, the Housing Ministry collaborated with the financial sector
because the Saudi financial sector is strong. Unfortunately, the health services private
sector in Saudi Arabia is still weak because there is limited public health insurance
and because the government provides free health services. Therefore, even if the
Health Ministry wanted to collaborate with the private sector, its choices would be
limited.
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Conversely, the PM scores for all ministries were 100. Since 2017, the Saudi
government has required that all ministries include performance measurements in
their annual reports. Furthermore, the Saudi government created (ADAA) to train
public employees about performance measurements. (ADAA) does both workshops
and training programs for public employees.
The PST scores varied: The Housing Ministry has the highest score of 52
points, the Commerce Ministry has the lowest score at zero points, and the Health
Ministry had 20 points. There is no clear explanation for the difference in PST scores,
but the appendix shows a correlation between the PST and PPP scores. Therefore, this
dissertation assumes that increasing PPP may support public organizations to
implement more PST. Another explanation is that novel ministries, such as the
Housing Ministry, may need to implement the private-sector tools to attract
employees.
The NPM Index scores varied significantly among the ministries, with the
Ministry of Commerce scoring the lowest at 33 points, the Housing Ministry scoring
the highest at 82 points, and the Health Ministry falling in between at 48 points. In
2017, the ministry of commerce implemented low NPM tools, implementing just PST,
the tools required by the Saudi government. The Health Ministry, which had a
medium level of NPM Index, implemented some NPM tools, but it needs to
encourage the current tools and include missing tools. The Housing Ministry had a
very high NPM Index score, having implemented most NPM tools. There is no
apparent reason for the varied NPM Index score among the ministries but dealing
with a daily base among the public may encourage the Housing Ministry to
collaborate with the private sector and implement private-sector tools. The NPM
Index showed decreasing based on dealing with the public.
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In contrast, the openness scores were approximately the same for all
ministries, tightly ranging between 25 and 30 on the PPS scale. The PPS scores were
low, not very low. Low PPS means that the ministries provided enough information
for the public. Furthermore, they asked for public feedback. At the same time, the
ministries did not involve the public or collaborate with them.
Scholars have provided two main reasons for the slight improvement in PPS in
Saudi Arabia: the Arab Spring and social media. Some studies showed more public
access for the ministries after the Arab Spring. Other scholars linked PPS and social
media. For instance, the ministries’ annual reports showed that they focused on social
media and called it the new media.
Correlation
The data in Appendix XI show that the implementation of NPM has had little
or no impact on PPS in these ministries. For example, while the Ministry of
Commerce has a low NPM Index score, it has the same PPS score as the Housing
Ministry, which scored very high on the NPM Index. All ministries had low PPS.
Even though the selected ministries are a small number, the researcher still
calculated a linear regression (ŷ = 23.8165+ 0.07086X). The coefficient is almost
0.07, indicating that NPM implementation did not correlate with PPS or openness.
The dissertation’s finding is significant because it emphasizes that the type of
government affects the NPM implementations. In monarchy governments, public
opinion is not essential, so public entities show low public participation.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion
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The dissertation has discussed the impact of NPM on the openness of three
ministries in Saudi Arabia. NPM reshapes public organizations in many aspects, such
as public-private participation (PPP) and performance measurements (PM). This
dissertation created an NPM Index to measure the NPM implementations of the three
Saudi ministries. It also adopted SSP to measure ministries' openness and used their
annual reports to collect data. The findings show no correlation between NPM
implementations and openness. The results emphasized that the government type
affects the public sector reformation theories, such as NPM.
This study has three main types of limitations: sample, measurements, and
data. In Saudi Arabia, some ministries do not provide their annual reports to the
public. Therefore, limited information affected the number of samples and how they
were selected. First, there are 25 ministries in Saudi Arabia. This dissertation focused
on three ministries, which is a small sample number. Second, the ministries were
selected because they published their annual report to the public. Therefore, the
study’s result cannot be generalized.
Second, the researcher created the NPM index and adopted PPS. The NPM
Index concentrates on three NPM activities: PPP, PST, and PM. These activities are
essential, but these activities do not represent all NPM activities. Therefore, the NPM
Index does not measure NPM implementations accurately. Additionally, the PPS
focuses on one democratic value, openness, and did not calculate other democratic
values, such as public accountability. The limited measurements minimize the
findings.
Third, this dissertation collected data from the selected ministries’ annual
reports. The collected data focused on one year, 2017. Analyzing many years would
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better support the findings. Furthermore, the ministries have internal departments that
prepare and publish the annual reports, which may bias the data.
Future research needs to include all ministries and appropriate measurements
for both NPM implementations and values to achieve accurate and objective findings.
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Appendix
Appendix I
Public Participation Spectrum (PPS)
Public Participation Spectrum (PPS)

Level
Description

Examples

Inform
To provide the
public with balanced
and objective
information to assist
them in
understanding the
problem,
alternatives,
opportunities, and/or
solutions.
Fact sheets (20).
Websites (20).
Open houses (20).
Social media (20).
Public campaign
(20).
Newspaper
comments and
articles (20).

Consult
To obtain public
feedback on
analysis,
alternatives, and
decisions.

Involve
To work directly
with the public
throughout the
process to ensure
that public concerns
and aspirations are
consistently
understood and
considered.

Collaborate
To partner with the
public in each aspect
of the decision,
including the
development of
alternatives and the
identification of the
preferred solution.

Empower
To place final
decision-making in
the hands of the
public.

Public comment
(40).
Focus groups (40).
Surveys (40).
Public meetings
(40).
TV & Radio
Interview (40).

Workshops (60).
Deliberative polling
(60).

Citizen advisory
(80). Committees
(80).
Consensus-loading
(80).
Participatory
decision-making
(80).

Citizen juries (100).
Ballots (100).
Delegated decisions
(100).
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Score

Cellphone
Application (20).
Call center (20).
Information graphics
(20).
Short videos (20).
Report (20).
Phone medical
consultation (20).
0-20
Very Low Openness

Online feedback
form (40).
Electronic mail (40).

21-40
Low Openness

41-60
Medium Openness
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61-80
High Openness

81-100
Very High Openness

Appendix II
Data Collecting Instrument
Data Collecting Instrument
Ministry’s Name:
How many programs does the ministry have?
How many programs use PPP strategies?
How many programs have performance measurements?
How many employees does the ministry have?
How many contracted employees does the ministry have?
The NPM Index
First factor: Public-Private Participation (PPP)
𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠
PPP’s score = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 ∗ 100
Compute

0-20
Very Low PPP
1

21-40
Low PPP
2

41-60
Medium PPP
3

61-80
High PPP
4

81-100
Very High PPP
5

41-60
Medium PM
3

61-80
High PM
4

81-100
Very High PM
5

41-60
Medium PST
3

61-80
High PST
4

81-100
Very High PST
5

61-80
High
NPM
4

81-100
Very High
NPM
5

Type

Score

Second factor: Performance Measurement (PM)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑀
PM’s score= 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠 ∗ 100
Compute

0-20
Very Low PM
1

21-40
Low PM
2

Third factor: Private-Sector Tools (PST)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
PST’s score= 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 ∗ 100
Compute

0-20
Very Low PST
1

21-40
Low PST
2

𝑃𝑃𝑃+𝑃𝑀+𝑃𝑆𝑇

The NPM Index for the ministry=
3
Compute
0-20
21-40
Very Low
Low NPM
NPM
1
2
PPS (Lists)
List
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

41-60
Medium
NPM
3

Method
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Appendix III
A Permission to use PPS
A Permission to use PPS
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Appendix IV
NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry
NPM Index score for the Saudi Housing Ministry.
List

NPM Index Factors

Score

1

PPP

94

2

PM

100

3

PST

52

The NPM Index score=

94+100+52
3

= 82 out of 100.
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Appendix V
PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry
PPS score for the Saudi Housing Ministry
Number

Method

Level

Score

1)

Social media

Inform

20

2)

Call center

Inform

20

3)

Short videos

Inform

20

4)

Reports

Inform

20

5)

Interviews

Consult

40

6)

Workshops

Involve

60

Total

180

PPS Level= 180/6

30 out of 100
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Appendix VI
NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry
NPM Index score for the Saudi Health Ministry.
List

NPM Index Factors

Score

1

PPP

24

2

PM

100

3

PST

20

The NPM Index score=

24+100+20
3

= 48 out of 100.
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Appendix VII
PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry
PPS score for the Saudi Health Ministry
Number

Method

Level

Score

1

Public comments

Consult

40

2

Information graphics

Inform

20

3

Website

Inform

20

4

Short videos

Inform

20

5

Reports

Inform

20

6

Phone medical consultation

Inform

20

7

Survey

Consult

40

Total

180

PPS Level= 180/7

26 out of 100
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Appendix VIII
NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce
NPM Index score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce
List

NPM Index Factors

Score

1

PPP

0

2

PM

100

3

PST

0

The NPM Index score=

0+100+0
3

= 33 out of 100.

100

Appendix IX
PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce
PPS score for the Saudi Ministry of Commerce
Number

Method

Level

Score

1)

Social media

Inform

20

2)

TV & Radio interviews

Consult

40

3)

Public campaign

Inform

20

4)

Newspapers comments & articles

Inform

20

5)

Cellphone App

Inform

20

6)

Call center

Inform

20

7)

Information graphics

Inform

20

8)

Website

Inform

20

9)

Online feedback form

Consult

40

10)

Survey

Consult

40

11)

Electronic mail

Consult

40

Total

300

PPS Level= 300/11

27 out of 100
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Appendix X
PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries
PPP, PM, PST, NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries
Ministry The Housing

The Health

The Ministry
of Commerce

Index

Ministry

Ministry

PPP

94

24

0

PM

100

100

100

PST

52

20

0

NPM Index

82 ( Very High)

48 (Medium)

33 (Low)

PPS

30 (Low)

26 (Low)

27 (Low)
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Appendix XI
NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries
NPM Index, and PPS scores for the Selected Ministries

NPM Index and PPS Scores for Selected Ministries
100
80
60
40
20
0
Ministry of Commerce and
Investment

Health Ministry
NPM Index
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Housing Ministry
PPS
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